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I. INTRODUCTION
While the State Department's three arguments for the legality
of the 1983 U.S. military action in Grenada have been analyzed in
the literature, the facts used by the Department to substantiate
those arguments have not been scrutinized systematically. This ar-
ticle will highlight key legal issues that have not received detailed
analysis and will assess the factual basis for the State Depart-
ment's three justifications.
II. SUMMARY OF STATE DEPARTMENT JUSTIFICATIONS
The State Department's position on the legality of the 1983
Grenada invasion is stated in a letter written by Legal Adviser Da-
vis R. Robinson to the American Bar Association on February 10,
1984.1 The Legal Adviser asserted three justifications but stated
that the Department "has not taken a position as to whether any
one of these grounds standing alone would have provided adequate
support for the action." The three grounds are (1) that the action
was taken pursuant to a request from the Governor-General of
Grenada; (2) that the action was legitimate regional collective ac-
tion undertaken by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States;
and (3) that the action was taken to protect U.S. citizens in
1. Letter from Davis R. Robinson, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,
to Prof. Edward Gordon, Chairman, Committee on Grenada, Section on International Law





III. SUMMARY OF POSITION OF ARTICLE
The author agrees with Time magazine that "the Administra-
tion has been somewhat disingenuous in its public explanations of
U.S. policy" in the Grenada invasion.' Although legally valid, the
justifications upon which the State Department relies are factually
unsupported. With respect to all three asserted justifications, the
Department seriously misrepresented facts to bolster its claim of
legality. For example, the Department asserted that U.S. nationals
in Grenada were in danger, yet could not substantiate a basis for
so believing. Arguing that it acted in response to a request from
the Government of Grenada, the Department knowingly made
three false assertions: (1) that Governor-General Paul Scoon had
issued such a request (in fact he had not); (2) that when Scoon
purportedly issued the request the United States had not yet de-
cided to invade (in fact it had); and (3) that when Scoon purport-
edly issued this request he was the only vestige of governmental
authority in Grenada (in fact there was a functioning government).
Arguing that its action was justified by a request from the Or-
ganization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Department
falsely asserted that this request was spontaneous and that the re-
quest motivated the United States to invade. In fact, the OECS
made its request only upon assurance that the United States would
respond favorably; U.S. planning for the invasion was well ad-
vanced by the time of the request. Additionally, upon realizing
that the action could not be grounded on Article 8 of the OECS
treaty, the Department falsely claimed that the OECS had acted
instead under Articles 3 and 6 of the treaty, though those two pro-
visions provide no sounder basis for the action.
The Legal Adviser's caveat that none of the three justifications
standing alone suffices to justify U.S. action casts doubt on all
three. The Legal Adviser declined to assert that any of the three
justifications provided a legal basis for the action. Further, he
failed to explain how a deficiency in one may be compensated by
2. Id. at 382-85. This article addresses only the arguments made by the Legal Adviser
in the cited letter. It does not address other possible arguments that could or have been
made to justify the use of force in Grenada by the United States.
3. TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 48. The article stated, "[I1n Grenada American aims go well
beyond those stated." Id.
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the other two. Moreover, he asserted, "we have emphasized the
mutually reinforcing nature of the elements of the position we did
take."4 This is novel international law theory since no doctrine in
international law permits a state to remedy a deficiency in one as-
serted justification for military intervention by relying on a differ-
ent asserted justification. This approach is illogical and without
precedent in the law regarding use of force. 5
IV. FIRST JUSTIFICATION: RESCUE OF NATIONALS
The State Department first argued that the invasion of Gre-
nada was justifiable as an operation to rescue endangered U.S. na-
tionals. The Department did not assert this argument as a total
justification because U.S. forces remained in Grenada after evacu-
ating U.S. nationals.' It did, however, rely on this argument as par-
tial justification. President Reagan stated that the reason "of over-
riding importance" was the protection of "innocent lives, including
up to a thousand Americans, whose personal safety is, of course,
my paramount concern." Secretary of State George Shultz stated
two reasons for Reagan's decision, the first being "his concern for
the welfare of American citizens living on Grenada."8 Accordingly,
the Legal Adviser stated that one basis for the action was "the
need to protect the 1,000 United States citizens on Grenada who
responsible United States authorities considered to be threatened
by the anarchic conditions on the island."
Several commentators called this alleged justification a pretext
asserted as a cover for other reasons for the operation. 10 Others
4. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 386.
5. The literature on justifications discusses each justification individually. None of the
writers suggests that a state may combine more than one justification where no single one
suffices. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 214-
349 (1963). Referring to the concept that an intervention justifiable on no single ground
might be justifiable on the basis of several asserted grounds taken together as the "cumula-
tive principle," Benton writes that, "Writers have not, to be sure, accepted the cumulative
principle." E. BawrroN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR
107 (1908).
6. Legal Adviser, supra note I, at 382.
7. Grenada: Collective Action by the Caribbean Peace Force, DEP'T. ST. BULL., Dec.
1983, at 67 [hereinafter Collective Action].
8. Id. at 69.
9. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 385.
10. Boyle, Chayes, Dore, Falk, Feinrider, Ferguson, Fine, Nunes & Weston, Interna-
tional Lawlessness in Grenada, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 172 [hereinafter Boyle]; Sultan, The In-
ternational Rule of Law Under the Reagan Administration, 10 DAYTo L. REv. 245, 252
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stated that the assertion was irrelevant because U.S. forces re-
mained after evacuating U.S. nationals and carried out functions
unrelated to protection of U.S. nationals.11 A group of scholars
commissioned to study the operation by the Section of Interna-
tional Law and Practice of the American Bar Association con-
cluded that the aim of protecting U.S. nationals was "collateral to
the primary purpose of favorably resolving an internal political
struggle. ' 12 Commentators who found this asserted justification
valid were John Norton Moore, Maj. Ronald Riggs, and Laura
Wheeler. Citing expressions of relief by evacuated U.S. nationals
and the "judgment of the four experienced Foreign Service Officers
on the scene," Moore stated that the evidence as to the danger was
"unequivocal." s
Those commentators who asserted the irrelevancy of the res-
cue-of-nationals argument are correct. That argument could justify
at most the initial landing and evacuation of U.S. nationals but not
the overthrow of the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) then
in control in Grenada. Those commentators who called the rescue-
of-nationals rationale a pretext were also correct. The following
facts indicate that concern for the safety of U.S. nationals was a
pretext:
(1) U.S. forces remained in Grenada after evacuating U.S. na-
(1985); F. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 272 (1985); E. HOrT, LAW AND
FORCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 144 (1985). Schachter notes that "most other countries
did not find that (rescue of U.S. nationals] a convincing ground [for U.S. action in Grenada]
and apparently considered it a pretext for the action." Schachter cites as evidence of this
reaction by other states the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the
U.S. action as a violation of the U.N. Charter. G.A. Res. 38/7, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 47,
at 19, U.N. Doc. A/Res/38/7 (1983); Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1632 (1984).
11. Nanda, The United States Armed Intervention in Grenada-Impact on World Or-
der, 14 CAL. WESTERN INT'L L.J. 395, 411 (1984); W. GILMORE, GRENADA INTERVENTION: ANAL-
YSIS AND DOCUMENTATION 64 (1984); Karas & Goodman, The United States Action in Gre-
nada: An Exercise in Realpolitik, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 53, 101 (1984); Levitin,
The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Humanitarian Inter-
vention, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 621, 649-50 (1986).
12. Committee on Grenada, Section of International Law and Practice, American Bar
Association, International Law and the United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18
INT'L LAW. 331, 379 (1984) [hereinafter Action in Grenada](the members of the Committee
included E. Gordon, Chairman; R. Bilder; A. Rovine; D. Wallace, Jr.).
13. Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145,
162 (1984)(in addition to asserting rescue of U.S. nationals, Moore asserts the broader doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention (protection of Grenadian nationals) as a justification);
Riggs, The Grenada Intervention: A Legal Analysis, 109 MILITARY L. REv. 1, 33-36 (1985);
Wheeler, The Grenada Invasion: Expanding the Scope of Humanitarian Intervention, 8
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 413, 426 (1985).
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tionals to accomplish other ends;
(2) the State Department did not view evacuation of U.S. na-
tionals as its only means of protecting them but tried to make Gre-
nada safe for U.S. nationals who remained;
(3) the State Department grossly exaggerated the level of do-
mestic uncertainty in Grenada;
(4) the RMC showed solicitude towards U.S. nationals in the
days immediately preceding October 25, 1983;
(5) most U.S. nationals in Grenada did not believe themselves
to be in danger in the days immediately preceding the U.S. landing
of October 25, 1983;
(6) State Department personnel in Grenada on October 22-23
endeavored to and did convince many of the U.S. nationals that
they were in danger;
(7) U.S. officials did not make good faith efforts with the RMC
to arrange transport for those U.S. nationals desiring to leave
Grenada;
(8) arriving U.S. forces were unaware of the location of most of
the U.S. nationals in Grenada and as a result reached most of them
one to three days after landing;
(9) arriving U.S. forces did not immediately endeavor to ap-
proach any U.S. nationals;
(10) in the course of combat and evacuation, U.S. forces seri-
ously endangered the lives of U.S. nationals; and
(11) during the hostilities between U.S. forces and the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Army of Grenada, the latter did not endeavor
to harm or seize any U.S. nationals.
A. U.S. Forces Remained in Grenada After Evacuating U.S.
Nationals to Accomplish Other Ends
When an intervening military force that asserts rescue-of-na-
tionals as a justification asserts additional justifications and ac-
complishes additional goals, doubt must be cast on the genuineness
of the assertion that intervention was required to protect nationals.
A rescue-of-nationals assertion is typically met with skepticism,1"'
14. A.V.W. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 18 (1967). Schachter
queries, "whether these other grounds for the U.S. action [in Grenada] vitiated the legality
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but when additional justifications are given, grounds for skepticism
are strengthened. Theoretically, a state may need to protect its na-
tionals and intervene for another lawful purpose. The assertion of
additional justifications, however, demands special caution in as-
sessing the factual basis for an asserted need to intervene to rescue
nationals.
B. The State Department Did Not View Evacuation of U.S.
Nationals as its Only Way of Protecting Them but Stated that it
Needed to Make Grenada Safe for U.S. Nationals
If the reason for military intervention is to protect endangered
nationals, intervention should not exceed evacuation of nationals.
That was not the course of action of the State Department in Gre-
nada. It did not view evacuation as the only way to protect U.S.
nationals. It stated that it would protect U.S. nationals by chang-
ing the domestic political order so that U.S. nationals could safely
reside there. The fact that the Department contemplated making
Grenada safe for U.S. nationals indicates that protecting U.S. na-
tionals was not a genuine purpose of the intervention. If it had
been, the U.S. forces would have evacuated them from the situa-
tion of supposed danger.
The fact that the Department contemplated making Grenada
safe for U.S. nationals as one means of protecting them was indi-
cated by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam in a colloquy in
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Senator Paul
Sarbanes. On October 27, 1983, Dam told the Committee that 378
U.S. nationals (out of approximately 1000 in Grenada) had been
transported out of Grenada by U.S. forces. 10 Sarbanes inquired
about the others:
SENATOR SARBANES. Is it our intention to bring all of
the American citizens out of Grenada?
MR. DAM. Not necessarily. I do not think that that ques-
tion has even been faced. If I may, I will double check that.
[Pause.]
of the rescue action." He replies: "As a matter of law and logic, they should not have done
so. But they understandably contributed to skepticism as to whether the essential motive
for the U.S. action was the emergency rescue." Schachter, supra note 10, at 1631.
15. The Situation in Grenada, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1983)[hereinafter Hearing: The Situation in Gre-
nada](remarks of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State).
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MR. DAM. In every case, it is strictly a voluntary decision
by the individual involved, and that goes for the students as well
as other Americans.
SENATOR SARBANES. In other words, we have sent
troops in to protect the safety of Americans and to bring them
out, but an American can decide to stay there. Is that correct?
MR. DAM. Correct.
SENATOR SARBANES. Well, then, are our troops going to
stay there to insure their safety?
MR. DAM. For a period of time, which is as short as possi-
ble, until law and order is restored.
SENATOR SARBANES. So in other words, as it develops,
then, part of our purpose or objective is to make Grenada safe
for Americans to continue to remain there?
MR. DAM. Well, we assume that it will become a normal
functioning democracy and we certainly do not tell American
citizens whether to stay or whether not to stay.
SENATOR SARBANES. But we intend to keep our mili-
tary there until that happens. Is that right?
MR. DAM. Until law and order is restored and the govern-
ment is functioning, yes.
MR. SARBANES. Well, I think the rationale for the action
is beginning to evaporate on you. I can understand going in
there to protect the safety of our people and bringing our people
out. Now, you are not doing that. You have gone in but are now
saying that people can stay. We are then going to change the
environment there in such a way that we can assure them that
they are going to be safe.
MR. DAM. Well, Senator, we do not intend to leave while
weapons are being fired in Grenada. We do not want Americans
to be killed.
SENATOR SARBANES. I understand that. Why do we not
bring the Americans out then?
MR. DAM. Why not suppress the--
SENATOR SARBANES. Do we have plans to bring out the
Americans?
MR. DAM. Suppress the disorders that are going on? It
seems to me that is a far preferable solution than allowing the
Cubans to stay to fire their weapons while we try to sneak the
1986]
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Americans out the other side of the island."
Dam's statement indicated that U.S. nationals could choose
whether to stay, thus conceding that many of them did not feel a
need to depart. 1 A state may not use the rationale of protecting
nationals to make another state safe for habitation by them. Advo-
cates of the rescue-of-nationals rationale argue that it applies only
where rescue of nationals is not a cover for some other purpose. 1'
The right of self-defense-the right to use force to protect nation-
als abroad-is limited by the requirement of proportionality. 9
Thus, if the intervening state's purpose is political change in the
territorial state, then the rescue-of-nationals justification does not
apply, as Senator Sarbanes correctly indicated, because it goes be-
yond the aim of rescuing nationals. A similarly broad concept of
protection of nationals was urged by the Belgian Foreign Minister
with respect to the 1960 Belgian intervention in the Congo. The
Belgian Foreign Minister told the Belgian Parliament that "secur-
ity implied not only the protection of the life of the men and the
honor of the women but also public order, that is, the opportunity
to work and even to sleep in peace." This broad reading of the
concept of protection of nationals was correctly criticized as "de-
priving it of any precise meaning and demonstrating clearly that it
is simply a pretext. '20
C. The State Department Grossly Exaggerated the Level of
Domestic Uncertainty in Grenada
Apparently, no U.S. nationals were harmed in Grenada. To
substantiate its contention that U.S. nationals in Grenada were in
danger, however, the State Department argued that anarchy
reigned, that a 24-hour curfew had been imposed, enforced by
shooting on sight, that it was uncertain who controlled the govern-
ment, and that there had been political violence among Grenadi-
ans.21 Additionally, United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
16. Id. at 43-44.
17. On the attitude of U.S. nationals towards departure, see text accompanying notes
57-69.
18. D. Bowmrr, SELP-DEPENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (1958).
19. Id.
20. M. BENNOUNA, LE CONSENTEMENT A L'ING9-RENCE MILITAIRE DANS LES CONFLITS IN-
TERNES 179 (1974).
21. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 68 (Reagan), 69 (Shultz), 72 (Kirkpatrick), 73
(Middendorf); Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 4. The text of the
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and Deputy Secretary Dam stated that the Department feared that
the RMC then in control in Grenada might take U.S. nationals
hostage.
2 2
The Administration claimed it found documents in Grenada
which indicated that the Grenada government, on advice of Cuba,
had devised a plan to take U.S. nationals hostage. An unidentified
''senior official" said,
It is clear from these documents and other information we now
have that serious consideration was being given to seizing Amer-
icans as hostages and holding them for reasons that are not en-
tirely clear, but seem to involve an effort to embarrass the
United States and, more immediately, to forestall American mil-
itary action in Grenada.23
This and other "senior officials" declined to describe the docu-
ments in detail or to discuss specific information that might show a
potential of a hostage-taking, alleging that the documents would
be made public after being translated and analyzed.24 To date, the
documents have not been made public.
Contradicting the position that the RMC might take hostages,
a State Department envoy present in Grenada on October 22-23
said he found no reason to believe that the RMC would harm U.S.
nationals. James Budeit, an officer of the U.S. Embassy in nearby
Barbados who flew to Grenada on October 22, stated his fear that a
countercoup might arise against the RMC, and might involve
armed conflict that could endanger U.S. nationals. Budeit said that
the RMC "wasn't that firmly in control."25
In fact, the Grenada situation was potentially harmless to re-
siding U.S. nationals. While the RMC was probably not supported
by the majority of Grenada's citizens, it was in effective control.
curfew announcement, from Radio Free Grenada on Oct. 19, 1983, is given in A. PAYNE, P.
SuTton & T. THORNDIKE, GRENADA: REVOLUTION AND INVASION 137 (1984)[hereinafter A.
PAvN].
22. See Collective Action, supra note 7, at 75, 80 (Kirkpatrick; Dam); U.S. Military
Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean, Hearing before
the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Western Hemi-
sphere Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1983)[hereinafter Hearing: U.S. Military Actions)(remarks of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy
Secretary Of State). Dam had no information that any U.S. nationals were harmed or
threatened in the days preceding the invasion. Id. at 46.
23. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A14, col. 5.
24. Id.
25. J. KWITNY, ENDLESS ENEMmS; THE MAKING OF AN UNFRIENDLY WORLD 417 (1984).
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The violence occurring in Grenada on October 19 ended when the
RMC imposed and enforced a curfew on October 20.26 The State
Department exaggerated the extent of the violence, which had
taken place primarily in downtown St. George's-not in the areas
of concentration of U.S. nationals, most of whom were the 650 stu-
dents at St. George's Medical School.2 7 The students were located
principally at three sites south of St. George's-Grand Anse cam-
pus, True Blue (Point Salines) campus, and the Lance aux tpines
residential area.2 8 No violence was directed against the U.S. na-
tionals, and moreover, the political differences between the two
contending groups were not of an anti-U.S. character. Thus, the
U.S. nationals were not viewed by any political group in Grenada
as a threat to Grenadian sovereignty and had not been the target
of anti-U.S. sentiment. The fact that the medical school had func-
tioned unmolested during the 1979 coup that brought the New
Jewel Movement to power supports this theory.29
Although a possibility existed of further change of govern-
ment-possibly a pro-Bishop countercoup3-there was little rea-
son to believe that such a countercoup, or any other foreseeable
political change, would endanger U.S. nationals."1 Charles R. Mod-
ica, Chancellor of St. George's Medical School, called the invasion
26. This fact was cited by Senator Pell, arguing that a government was in place in
Grenada under the Revolutionary Military Council. Hearing: The Situation in Grenada,
supra note 15, at 35. Robert Pastor, who had been Senior Staff member in charge of Latin
American and Caribbean Affairs on the National Security Council, 1977-1981, termed "the
political situation" in Grenada at the time of the invasion as "no more uncertain, no more
dangerous, no more violent than the political situation in countries that have experienced
rapid political change. Indeed, I would argue that it was probably much less dangerous."
Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 73 (statement of Prof. Robert Pastor,
School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland). Pastor said that "the military coup in
Chile and the revolution in Nicaragua were much more violent, and indeed Americans were
killed in both." Id. at 83. Schachter notes with respect to the argument that U.S. nationals
might have been taken hostage: "The Americans on the island were not hostages and threats
had not been made against them. Whether they would have been seized as hostages to fore-
stall a U.S. invasion or subject to hostile military action remains conjectural." Schachter,
supra note 10, at 1631.
27. J. KwiTNv, supra note 25, at 408.
28. See infra text accompanying note 90.
29. Vice-Chancellor Bourne said one factor that led him to adopt a wait-and-see atti-
tude during the events in Grenada was that, "[F]ollowing the previous revolution no student
had been in danger and we only lost one day of lectures." Hearing: U.S. Military Actions,
supra note 22, at 187 (statement of Geoffrey Bourne, M.D., Vice-Chancellor, St. George's
University School of Medicine).
30. J. KwrrN', supra note 25, at 417.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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"very unnecessary" to save his students.3 2 Further, on October 24,
White House spokesperson Larry Speakes said there was no indi-
cation of danger to U.S. nationals in Grenada."3 Additionally, the
discrepancy widened when the Department failed to explained how
the U.S. nationals could be safe October 24 but in danger October
25, although no significant changes occurred between these dates.
On October 25, President Reagan was asked to explain why
there was danger on October 25 but not on October 24:
Q: Mr. President, as late as yesterday, your own spokesman
said that Americans on Grenada were in no danger. Did you
have information that things had changed?
REAGAN: They were in no danger in the sense of that,
right now, anything was being done to them. But we know that
there was concern on the part of those, because already we'd
been informed of several hundred who wanted to leave. But the
airports were closed. There was no way of leaving. This was a
case of not waiting until something actually happened to them.
But we did manage to get some intelligence out of the island,
intelligence information on this. And the tenuous situation was,
as I said, the only authority that you could say of a governmen-
tal nature on that island was a 24-hour curfew with orders to
"shoot on sight" anyone found moving in those 24 hours.3 '
President Reagan's statement does not state facts that indicate
danger existed. Reagan accurately stated that no harm had come
to U.S. nationals. He suggested that "several hundred wanted to
leave," a statement factually accurate but not reflecting any danger
to the U.S. nationals since the desire to leave was based on (1) fear
of an invasion and (2) the urgings of U.S. diplomats.3 5 Reagan also
cited the fact that "the airports [were] closed" to indicate that, if
danger existed, there was no escape. In fact, U.S. officials had
made no effort to arrange air transport out of Grenada, though the
RMC had agreed to permit it.3 '
British diplomatic personnel in Grenada between October 22
and 24 found no imminent danger to the 250 British citizens in
Grenada.87 The Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, told the
32. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A20, col. 5.
33. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A12, col. 4.
34. Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A7, col. 4.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 64-69.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 72-84.
37. A. PAYME, supra note 21, at 155.
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House of Commons that the resident representative of the British
High Commission in Grenada had been in contact with the British
community and reported no immediate danger to them. 8 The
British had a destroyer off Grenada for possible evacuation but
found no need to use it.
9
A British diplomat visiting Grenada from Barbados reported
the situation as of October 22-23 as "calm but tense."' 0 On Octo-
ber 24, the 24-hour curfew imposed on October 20 was lifted, open-
ing shops and offices, though schools remained closed, and an 8
p.m. to 5 a.m. curfew was imposed.4 1 At that point, conditions were
returning to normal. The RMC was moving to establish a civilian
government that would include the business sector.4 2 Three British
analysts concluded, "the prospect of further chaos in Grenada,
which Reagan felt it necessary to forestall was not likely. In fact,
after the killings of Bishop and the others on 19 October, the strict
curfew had effectively put a stop to further outbreaks of
disorder."4
3
The night before the invasion the situation was calm enough
that RMC member Leon Cornwall was able to invite U.S. diplomat
Budeit to accompany him to a local disco called the Sugar Mill.
Budeit, however, declined the invitation: "I had to protect myself
with my own government. I can't go to discos with them. Our pres-
ident called them a gang of leftist thugs, although Cornwall
seemed a nice enough guy."4 4 Admittedly, the State Department
received reports from its personnel in Grenada that may have led
it to believe that the situation in Grenada was less stable than it
actually was. For example, the plane carrying the first two State
Department personnel that tried to land in Grenada after the
38. 47 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 27 (1983).
39. Id. at 25; London Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
40. As quoted by Sir Geoffrey Howe, House of Commons, 47 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.)
27 (1983).
41. A. PAYNE, supra note 21, at 142.
42. Id. at 139. On October 24 the RMC informed the U.S. Embassy in Barbados by
telex that it would yield to civilian rule within two weeks. The text of the telex was read to
the O.A.S. on October 26 by Grenada representative, Ian Jacobs. Permanent Council, Or-
ganization of American States, Acta de la sesi6n extraordinaria celebrada el 26 de Octubre
de 1983, at 5, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.G, Doc. CP/ACTA 543/83 (1983) [hereinafter Acta de la
sesi6n extraordinarial.
43. Id. at 156. Pastor queried: "Is it possible that the 'marines got there just in time'
before the new Grenadian government could prove to the international community that it
was a government, and that it could assure the safety of U.S. citizens?" Hearing: U.S. Mili-
tary Actions, supra note 22, at 84.
44. J. KwITNY, supra note 25, at 416.
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RMC was formed was denied permission to land and had to divert
to a nearby island. The Department took this as an indication of
instability or lack of cooperation on the part of the RMC. The U.S.
Embassy in Barbados telephoned Bourne to ask about possible
reasons for the landing denial, and Bourne proceeded to investi-
gate. He discovered that Gen. Hudson Austin's office did not have
a telephone number for security forces at the airport and had
therefore not passed the word to admit the plane. The problem
was resolved, and the diplomats were later permitted to land.
4 5
On October 23, State Department personnel in Grenada re-
ported that they had been shot at while landing; this was later dis-
covered to be false. They further reported to the State Department
that they were held at the airport by armed soldiers (yet later ac-
knowledged this was not true) and that a diplomat they were re-
placing was mysteriously missing (he in fact was simply late get-
ting to the airport)." This information may have created
unwarranted apprehension in the State Department. Nonetheless,
the Department had not met its burden and failed to demonstrate
that the situation in Grenada posed imminent danger to U.S.
nationals.
D. The RMC Showed Solicitude Towards U.S. Nationals
During the Period Immediately Preceding October 25, 1983
The RMC, aware that the U.S. might argue danger to its na-
tionals to justify a landing in Grenada, showed great concern for
the well-being of students at the medical school. This fact does not
indicate that the students would have been shown the same solici-
tude had the RMC been overthrown. However, it does indicate
that little danger existed from RMC action, which was the fear
cited by the State Department. 47
On October 20, the day after the RMC came to power, two
soldiers visited Vice-Chancellor Geoffrey Bourne of the St.
45. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 191 (statement of G. Bourne).
46. J. KWITNY, supra note 25, at 415. Dam said that arriving U.S. envoys "were met at
the airport the first time by a bunch of teenagers with guns, which indicated that there was
really a total breakdown of any normal governmental processes." Hearing: U.S. Military
Actions, supra note 22, at 27.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. A strong practical reason for RMC solici-
tude beyond fear of a U.S. invasion was that the school's contribution to the Grenadian
economy amounted to about one-fifth its operating budget. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions,
supra note 22, at 176, 197 (statement of G. Bourne).
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George's Medical School (the school's highest official in Grenada
during the events in question). They inquired as to whether the
students had sufficient food and water for the four-day curfew.
Bourne informed them that the water available at the True Blue
campus would suffice for only one more night and "they had water
trucks down there within a couple of hours.""8 That same day
Bourne received a good-will visit from Gen. Hudson Austin, the
highest RMC official, who assured Bourne that the students would
be safe.4 e
The following day the RMC exempted a medical school driver
from the curfew and provided Bourne with a pass and a police es-
cort to travel anywhere he wished.' 0 Throughout the four-day cur-
few, high-ranking army officers inquired about the students' wel-
fare, guaranteed their safety, and stated the students could leave
Grenada if they so desired."1
On October 22, two U.S. diplomats arrived in Grenada from
Barbados 2 and were assured by Maj. Cornwall that the students
were safe.'3 In an October 24 telex sent to the U.S. Embassy in
Barbados, the RMC stated that it would protect the lives and
property of U.S. citizens and would provide air transportation by
regular or chartered flights for anyone wishing to leave.0 4 State De-
partment officials said that they considered these assurances unre-
liable on the ground that the RMC's position was still unstable,
48. J. KWITNY, supra note 25, at 412. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at
187-88 (statement of G. Bourne).
49. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 188, 191 (statement of G.
Bourne). Bourne stated that Austin gave him his home telephone number in case of any
difficulty. Id. at 191. He stated that Austin seemed sincere, but questioned whether Austin
could be trusted if he had executed political colleagues. Id. at 195. At the same time, Bourne
thought that, "any future government of Grenada would want the school to stay" because of
the economic benefits to Grenada. Id. at 179.
50. J. KWITNY, supra note 25, at 412; Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at
188 (statement of G. Bourne). Bourne stated that after Grenadian troops arrived in the
Grand Anse area, the site of the larger medical school campus, faculty members were per-
mitted to drive buses to a nearby concentration of off-campus students in order to take
them to the Grand Anse campus, which they did without interference from the Grenadian
army. Id. at 196.
51. J. KWITNY, supra note 25, at 412; Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at
179 (statement of G. Bourne).
52. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at A12, col. 1. London Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at 10, col. 5.
H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, GRENADA: AN EYEWrrNEss AccouNT OF THE U.S. INVASION AND THE CARIB-
BEAN HISTORY THAT PROVOKED IT 151-53 (1984).
53. J. KWTNY, supra note 25, at 412.
54. Statement of Grenada (Mr. Jacobs), 38 U.N. SCOR (2487th mtg.) at 42, U.N. Doe.
S/P.V. 2487 (1983) (giving text of telex).
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and claiming that it had actually impeded the departure of stu-
dents from Grenada. However, there was no reason to believe that
the RMC's position was unstable. 0 Even if it were, the possibility
of a change in government presented no imminent danger to U.S.
nationals. Moreover, as indicated below, the RMC did not impede
departure of U.S. nationals."
E. Most U.S. Nationals Did Not Believe They Were In Dan-
ger
One circumstance cited by State Department officials to sub-
stantiate the existence of danger for U.S. nationals in Grenada was
that many of those evacuated expressed gratitude for the evacua-
tion and stated that they had been in danger.57 Yet few U.S. na-
tionals felt they were in danger at the time of Bishop's death and
the institution of the 24-hour curfew." The medical students had
been treated well by Bishop and had gotten along well with the
Cuban workers, who were their neighbors at Point Salines. The
students and the Cubans had played softball together; Cuban doc-
tors had taught at the medical school." Both Vice-Chancellor
Bourne and U.S. envoy Budeit stated that on October 22 and 23
only about fifteen percent of the medical students wanted to leave
Grenada. 0 A group of 500 parents of St. George's medical students
sent President Reagan a telegram on October 24 asking him not to
send troops into Grenada."1 The parents were apparently not fear-
ful for the safety of their children, at least if there was no U.S.
invasion.
By October 24, however, 300 students wanted to leave." Be-
tween October 22 and October 24 there had been no deterioration
in the internal situation in Grenada. Two factors account for the
increase in the number of students who felt they were in danger.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
57. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 81 (Deputy Secretary Dam).
58. H. O'SHAUOHNESSY, supra note 52, at 166.
59. P. Bourne, Was the U.S. Invasion Necessary?, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at IV3, col.
4. Bourne was on the faculty of St. George's Medical School and is the son of Vice-Chancel-
lor Geoffrey Bourne.
60. J. KWITNY, supra note 25, at 413. Bourne also estimated that 10% desired to leave
as of October 22. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 193.
61. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A12, col. 2.
62. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at Al, col. 1 (quoting U.S. diplomats in Barbados).
Bourne gives a similar figure. J. KwiTNm, supra note 25, at 414.
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First, on the evening of October 23 radio stations from other is-
lands broadcast "rumors" that neighboring island states might in-
vade Grenada. According to Bourne, "this scared the students very
much ... The news [of an impending invasion] had been very dis-
turbing to them and now over fifty percent wanted to get out." s
Thus, one apparent reason for student fear was the invasion itself.
Second, U.S. envoy Budeit reported that he and the other four
U.S. diplomats in Grenada on October 22-23 convinced students
that they were in danger and should leave.6 4 Budeit felt the stu-
dents were in danger because of the possibility of a countercoup."
He stated that he explained this possibility to them in an effort to
encourage them to leave Grenada. In fact, on October 24, he and
Linda Flohr, another U.S. diplomat, pressured the students into
making a quick decision, telling them, "You've got to make up
your own minds. We're not going to stick around here forever."
Budeit convinced married students living near St. George's radio
station that in the event of a countercoup, the radio station would
be the scene of action. Consequently, he "scared the hell out of
those people." He claimed that he later saw the wives of some of
these married students on the campus, where "they were weeping,
crying." Upon seeing them cry he stayed away from them, feeling
"[He] had done [his] bit, and gotten them out of there." 6 One
medical student said that U.S. officials had convinced him it would
be dangerous to stay. 7 The Administration failed to explain why
63. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 193 (statement of G. Bourne).
64. J. KwrrNc, supra note 25, at 413-14. Representative Mervyn Dymally said, "The
anxiety level of the students was only raised after two American consular officers visited the
island and, of course, after the invasion." Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at
3 (statement of Mervyn M. Dymally, member of the House of Representatives from
California).
65. J. KWrrNY, supra note 25, at 417. Bourne said that the students harbored such fears
but did not indicate whether the fears were the result of conversations with State Deptart-
ment officials. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 178, 195.
66. J. KwITNv, supra note 25, at 414. The New York Times reported that the returning
students were divided as to whether the invasion was necessary to protect them. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at Al, col. 5. Despite his statements indicating RMC restraint vis-h-vis
the students, Vice-Chancellor Bourne stated that the U.S. action "was amply justified from
the point of view of the students" because "we had a volatile and highly dangerous situation
as far as the students were concerned, which could have become disastrous at any minute."
Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 179. Bourne said, however, that the stu-
dents were not in immediate danger, indicating that by working with Austin he had "bought
the safety of the students." Id. at 178.
67. Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1983, at A16, col. 3. Another of the U.S. diplomats, Kenneth
Kurze, said he did not urge students to leave Grenada: "We have not recommended that
they leave." A. PAYNE, supra note 21, at 155, citing Int'l Herald Tribune, Oct. 25, 1983. H.
O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at 166.
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State Department officials in Grenada were telling students they
were in danger at the same time that White House spokesperson
Larry Speakes was telling the press they were not."'
Thus, two factors apparently changed the minds of many of
the students: the urging of the U.S. diplomats and the fear of an
invasion. The fact that most U.S. nationals did not believe that
they were in danger prior to October 24 does not necessarily mean
that they were not in danger.6 However, it is a strong indication
that the situation in Grenada was not as chaotic as the State De-
partment alleged.
F. State Department Personnel Endeavored to Convince the
U.S. Nationals That They Were in Danger in Order to Make it
Appear That They Were in Danger
As previously discussed, State Department personnel con-
vinced many of the medical students that they were in danger.
This could have been done by the State Department for one of two
reasons. They might have genuinely been concerned for the stu-
dents' safety or may have realized that an invasion justified on the
basis of rescuing of nationals would be more credible if U.S. na-
tionals believed they were in danger.
Possibly, the Department genuinely believed the students
were in danger. The Department was heavily influenced by the
view that East-West conflict was paramount in all parts of the
world. Viewing the RMC as pro-Soviet, it may have believed that
the RMC might take the students hostage. It may also have be-
lieved that a countercoup was possible. Even if it believed there
might be a countercoup, no justification was given as to why such a
countercoup would pose a danger to the students. A countercoup
would have presumably brought the pro-Bishop forces back to
power, and Bishop posed no danger to the students. Danger might
have come from the civil strife brought on by an attempted
countercoup. Such danger, however, was remote because most of
the students were located away from population centers.
Another indication of the State Department's effort to make it
appear U.S. medical students were in danger was that it tried to
68. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A12, col. 4.
69. Captain W.T. DeCamp, U.S. Marine Corps, writes: "Americans on the island of
Grenada were in grave and imminent danger whether they knew it or not." DeCamp, Gre-
nada: The Spirit and the Letter of the Law, NAVAL WAR C. REV., May-June 1985, at 28, 29.
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convince St. George's Medical School to declare that its students
were in danger. According to a St. George's professor then in the
United States, "on Wednesday 19 October, I received a call from a
member of the board of trustees, a distinguished and very con-
servative man who said that the State Department was pressuring
school officials in New York to say publicly that the students in
Grenada were in danger so that Washington would have a pretext
to invade the island." 70
It seems likely that the State Department, endeavoring to con-
vince students they were in danger and urging the medical school
to make a declaration of danger, was laying the groundwork for an
invasion that would be launched for reasons unrelated to the safety
of the students. By the time the Department officials urged the
students to go home (Oct. 22-23), the decision to invade had been
made and U.S. ships were already positioned to invade Grenada at
dawn on October 25.71 That invasion would seem more legitimate if
the U.S. nationals were in need of rescue, and it would be difficult
to rescue them if they did not want to be rescued.
G. The State Department Did Not Try to Arrange Trans-
port for Those U.S. Nationals Desiring to Leave Grenada
A principal reason the State Department gave for using mili-
tary force to evacuate U.S. nationals was lack of other means to
evacuate them. Had it been possible to evacuate them by other
means, military force would not be justified.72 As indicated above,
it was not until October 24 that a substantial number of U.S. na-
tionals desired to leave. However, the Administration had already
decided to send in troops at 5:00 a.m. on October 25 for a full-scale
invasion.7 U.S. diplomats carried on discussions with RMC offi-
cials on October 22 and 23 regarding transportation for U.S. na-
tionals. The State Department's purpose in those discussions was
not to secure the evacuation of U.S. nationals but to build a case as
to why it was not possible to evacuate them without military force.
One course for the diplomats might have been to evacuate the stu-
dents prior to the invasion. Yet because a large number of students
70. Bourne, supra note 59, cols. 4-5. Bourne's statement to the same effect is reported
in The Village Voice, Nov. 8, 1983, at 8.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 297-99.
72. D. Bowa-r, supra note 18, at 105.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 276-99.
[Vol. 18:2
U.S. INVASION OF GRENADA
did not wish to leave until October 24, it was logistically infeasible
to get them out before the invasion. No serious effort was made to
evacuate them prior to the invasion. If the U.S. officials learned on
October 24 that a large number of students wanted to leave and if
these officials wanted to get them out safely, the invasion could
have been postponed. However, that would have eliminated one ra-
tionale to justify the invasion.
Administration officials cited the RMC's alleged failure to per-
mit flights out of Pearls Airport on October 24 as a major reason
why it was unable to evacuate U.S. nationals and had to use mili-
tary force. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated:
Attempts were made to get Americans out; however, the
Military Council failed to live up to its assurances that the air-
port would be opened on October 24 and foreigners would be
free to leave. Therefore, the U.S. was unable to get any Ameri-
cans out on charter flights prior to the U.S. invasion."
Deputy Secretary of State Dam said, to the same effect: "Charter
flights were not allowed in [to Pearls Airport]." '
These statements were false. Four charter flights flew in to
and out of Pearls Airport on October 24.76 A former Reagan ad-
ministration official reported flying out of Pearls Airport that day
on a charter flight. 7 An additional chartered Canadian flight
would have used Pearls Airport on October 24, had the flight not
been canceled by the charterer, Leeward Islands Air Transport,
owned jointly by several Caribbean states that were collaborating
with the United States in the invasion.7 8
74. Situation in Lebanon and Grenada: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1983)[hereinafter Hearing: Situation in
Lebanon and Grenada].
75. Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 28. A week later Dam ac-
knowledged that charter planes had in fact been permitted to use Pearls airport on October
24. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 37, 46.
76. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 3.
77. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at A7, col. 3 (Robert J. Myers, retired chief actuary of
the social security system). That the State Deptartment envoys did not try to use Pearls
Airport on October 25 to fly out students is noted in Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra
note 22, at 234 (statement of Colin Moore, Caribbean Action Lobby).
78. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 47 (statement of Rep. Stephen J.
Solarz of New York); Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 12, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Toronto Globe and
Mail, Nov. 15, 1983, at 9, col. 1; Bourne, supra note 59, at IV3, col. 5; London Times, Oct.
25, 1983, at 1, col. 3. CARICOM (Caribbean Community) had banned flights to Grenada on
October 22. London Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 3; LATIN AMERICA BUREAU, GRENADA-
WHOSE FREEDOM? 84 (1984).
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U.S. diplomats in Grenada at the time were making no effort
to use Pearls Airport to evacuate U.S. nationals. Major Cornwall
offered to allow chartered civilian planes to land at Pearls Airport
to evacuate students. U.S. officials declined, claiming the short air-
strip at Pearls would only accommodate planes holding no more
than forty-six persons, so that evacuation would take too long to
be done safely. They also said that the road to Pearls Airport was
long and difficult and suggested evacuation by a U.S. battleship to
be loaded by landing craft. Austin and Cornwall rejected this idea
as smacking too much of a military occupation.79 The diplomats
then suggested they could use the Cunard cruise ship Countess,
scheduled to arrive in Grenada on October 25, to evacuate the stu-
dents from Grenada. Cornwall agreed. This plan was never formal-
ized however, because officials in Washington reportedly refused
the Cunard option. Thus, at the time of the invasion, the RMC
had agreed to an evacuation plan. 0
Modica, the medical school chancellor, believed it possible to
evacuate the students without an invasion. Concerned that the in-
vasion endangered the students and that the State Department
had concealed the impending invasion from him, he stated, "If
they had [informed me], we would have taken the necessary ac-
tions to see that the students left peacefully."81 The Canadian
Government publicly stated it suspected that the State Depart-
ment pressured the Caribbean governments who own Leeward Is-
lands Air Transport into cancelling the flight it had chartered for
79. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 193 (statement of G. Bourne).
Bourne was called by Austin on October 21 and asked how many students wanted to leave
and by what means could they be transported out of Grenada. At Cornwall's request,
Bourne arranged a meeting at a hotel between Budeit and Cornwall to discuss student de-
parture arrangements. Bourne allayed Cornwall's fears about Budeit's suggestion of a heli-
copter landing by telling Cornwall that Budeit was only discussing possible actions in case
of extreme necessity. Id. at 192-93.
80. J. KwTNrY, supra note 25, at 413. Former NSC Caribbean specialist Pastor said,
"[T]here appears to have been no effort by the Administration to ... arrange an evacuation
of U.S. citizens." Hearings: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 82. For a version of the
Cornwall-State Deptartment discussions where Cornwall refused to allow the use of the
Cunard ship and alternatively agreed and disagreed to the departure of charter flights, see
G. SANDFORD & R. VIGILANTE, GRENADA: THE UNTOLD STORY 8 (1985). Their version is less
credible than Kwitny's for two reasons. First, they cite no sources. Second, their general
account of the events surrounding the invasion is highly inaccurate. For a conclusion that
U.S. officials could have arranged evacuation without invading, see TIME, Nov. 14, 1983, at
19. The Reagan administration rejected the Cunard option. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at
A21, col. 5.
81. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A20, col. 6. Modica reversed his view after discussions
at the State Department. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A29, col. 5.
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October 24.82 The State Department could thus make it appear
that the RMC was not permitting the flight. This in turn enhanced
the State Department's argument that military action was needed
to evacuate U.S. nationals.8 Subsequently, the Canadian Govern-
ment stated that it had found no evidence to implicate the United
States in the flight cancellation."' Nonetheless, clearly Pearls Air-
port was available on October 24, and U.S. officials did not attempt
to use it.
H. Arriving U.S. Forces Were Unaware of the Location of
Most of the U.S. Nationals
A further indication that rescue of U.S. nationals was not a
genuine reason for the invasion was that U.S. forces arriving in
Grenada were not informed of the location of most of those nation-
als. The forces were aware of the location only of medical students
but did not know the location of the several hundred other U.S.
nationals in Grenada. Furthermore, they were only aware of the
location of the 100 students at the True Blue campus near the
Point Salines airstrip. They were not aware of the location or even
the existence of 550 students at private housing sites and at the
Grand Anse campus. This campus is located just south of the capi-
tal city of St. George's, in the residential area called Lance aux
Epines, just east of Point Salines.
When President Reagan was asked at a news conference on
October 25 whether U.S. citizens in Grenada were safe, his answer
indicated that he was unaware of the location of the students. He
replied, "As far as we know, the citizens are safe. We have been
monitoring that very closely." 8 However, at the time of the news
conference, U.S. forces did not know the location of most of the
U.S. students or others. As late as October 27, Reagan was still
using the erroneous information that most of the students were at
the True Blue campus. In a televised address, he stated, "Almost
instantly our military seized the two airports, secured the campus
where most of our students were and they're now in the mopping-
up phase."8' 8 Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger later acknowl-
82. Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 12, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
83. Id. Barrow, The Danger of Rescue Operations, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 3, 4 (1983).
84. Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 15, 1983, at 9, col. 1.
85. Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A7, col. 4.
86. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A10, cols. 5-6.
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edged to a House subcommittee that military commanders had not
known the students' locations. When asked whether it were true
that "operation commanders were not aware that the Medical
School in Grenada had two separate campuses," Weinberger re-
plied, "Initially it was not known that the medical school had two
campuses."8 7
If the operation were a rescue mission, U.S. civilian officials in
Grenada during October 22-24 would have conferred with the vice-
chancellor, Geoffrey Bourne, to plan an evacuation. Yet no indica-
tion exists that any such discussions were held with Bourne or
other medical school officials.88 State Department personnel must
have known of the existence of the Grand Anse campus and the
Lance aux Epines residential area because State Department en-
voy Budeit visited married students at their homes in the suburbs
of St. George's.8 9 Evidently they did not transmit that information
to military commanders.
If rescuing students was a motivation for the landing, then the
failure to get that information to the commanders was a serious
error, one that put those students in danger. Major General H.
Norman Schwarzkopf considered it an unfortunate, but not un-
usual intelligence failure. He told reporters that U.S. commanders
were aware in advance that there were 103 students at the True
Blue campus but unaware of 224 others at the Grand Anse campus
and 202 more at the Lance aux Epines residential area.'0 The re-
port prepared by Adm. Wesley McDonald, overall commander of
the Grenada operation, similarly indicates a lack of knowledge re-
garding the location of the students:
Evacuee locating information was not available except that they
were generally located in the St. Georges area. During execution
of the operation, interviews with the first evacuees provided lo-
cation information for other potential evacuees."1
Elsewhere in his report, McDonald writes:
87. Hearing: Situation in Lebanon and Grenada, supra note 74, at 56 (question of Rep.
Joseph Addabbo, Chairman, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, House Commit-
tee on Appropriations; response of Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense).
88. Bourne mentions no discussion with the State Dept. officials with whom lie was in
contact about any procedures to evacuate students.
89. J. KwITNY, supra note 25, at 413-14.
90. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 1.
91. Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, Operation Urgent Fury Report at
11-9 (1984).
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NEO [non-combatant evacuation operation] related intelligence
was inadequate as rescue operations began. The three separate
locations of the medical students were not known to military
planners at the start of URGENT FURY. 2
As a result of not knowing the locations of all the students, U.S.
forces were not able to approach most of them on the first day of
the operation. 3 This lack of information casts doubt on the State
Department's claim that evacuation of the students was a motiva-
tion for the Grenada landing. It is inconceivable that commanders
purportedly planning a rescue mission would not ascertain the lo-
cation of those they were planning to rescue. Failure to do so is a
strong indication that rescue of U.S. nationals was a pretext.
I. Arriving U.S. Forces Did Not Immediately Endeavor to
Approach U.S. Nationals
Another factor suggesting that the rescue of U.S. nationals was
a pretext was that arriving U.S. forces did not immediately pro-
ceed to those medical students whose location was known. U.S.
forces made their initial landings at two sites in Grenada. The first,
at 5:00 a.m., was by Marines at the Pearls Airport, a site near
which there were no U.S. nationals. The second, at 5:30 a.m., was
by U.S. Army Rangers at Point Salines, where a new airport was
under construction, and very near to the True Blue campus, where
103 medical students resided. The Marines overcame resistance at
Pearls quickly and made no effort to locate students. Upon land-
ing, the Rangers encountered minor resistance from the People's
Revolutionary Army units (PRA) but did not immediately proceed
to the nearby True Blue campus.
After landing, one segment of the Rangers began clearing vehi-
cles and debris from the Point Salines airstrip that had evidently
been placed there to block its use by incoming U.S. aircraft. An-
other segment took up positions on high ground above the airstrip
surrounding the PRA positions and the Cuban workers' dormito-
ries.9 4 No Rangers however approached the True Blue campus, lo-
cated at the eastern end of the airstrip.
President Reagan, asserting that protection of the medical stu-
dents was a "prime objective" of the operation, incorrectly claimed
92. Id. at VII-5.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
94. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 3.
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that the arriving forces immediately went to the True Blue
campus:
And one of our prime objectives in the actual invasion that was
almost instantly done was the securing of that St. George's Med-
ical College where several hundreds of the students were."
In fact, U.S. forces approached the True Blue campus only several
hours later."' One reason for this delay was that the arriving Rang-
ers first attacked a group of Cuban construction workers who had
not planned to resist their entry into Grenada or their passage to
the True Blue campus.9 7 Since the Cuban dormitories were north
of the airstrip, while the True Blue campus was off its eastern end
(the airstrip is east-west), it was unnecessary for the Rangers,
landing from the south, to go near the dormitories to approach the
campus. Several of the Cuban workers expressed surprise that the
Rangers had not gone immediately to the student dormitories. Al-
berto Diaz, a Cuban bricklayer, stated the Rangers "occupied a hill
and took up attack positions. I was watching them and I thought
they were doing this [landing in Grenada] to take the U.S. stu-
dents away but they advanced to where we were." 8 When the
Rangers arrived at the True Blue campus, they did not transport
its residents from Grenada until the following day.
Although U.S. forces delayed in approaching those students of
whose location they were aware, they did not approach the others
until even later. Most of the U.S. students (426) were located at
the Grand Anse campus and at the Lance aux Ekpines residential
area. U.S. forces didn't get to the Grand Anse campus until the
afternoon of October 26.e1 On October 28, they found the students
at the Lance aux Ppines residential area,100 by accident while in
95. J.N. MooRE, LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION 93 (1984). Reagan was wrong about the
number of students at the True Blue campus. There were only 103, out of a total of 650.
96. The Marine Corps report on the combat states that Rangers "secured" the True
Blue campus "by 1028 on D-Day." U.S. MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COM-
MAND NEWSLETTER: OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW, Jan.-Mar. 1984, at 12 [hereinafter OPERATIONAL
OVERVIEW].
97. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 6, col. 5; JCS Replies to Criticism of Grenada Opera-
tion, ARMY, Aug. 1984, at 28 [hereinafter JCS Replies](indicating that U.S. Rangers at-
tacked the Cuban construction workers). The Joint Chiefs of Staff report also appears as
JCS Analysis of the "Lind" Report, ARMED FORCES J. INT'L, July 1984, at 12-18, 99. See also
Quigley, Parachutes at Dawn: Issues of Use of Force and and Status of Internees in the
U.S.-Cuban Hostilities on Grenada, 1983, 17 U, MIAMI INrTs-Am. L. REV. 199-248 (1986).
98. Granma Weekly Review, Nov. 13, 1983, at 7, col. 1.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 114-16.
100. The commander's report on activity for October 28, 1983 in Grenada, states, "TF
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the area for other purposes.01 Failure to proceed immediately to
the True Blue campus and to determine the location of the major-
ity of the students strongly suggests that the rescue of the students
was not a purpose of the landing.
J. U.S. Forces Seriously Endangered the Lives of U.S.
Nationals
Whatever danger the U.S. medical students might have faced
in Grenada was far less than the danger to which they were ex-
posed by the October 25 landing. 102 As indicated above, medical
students were frightened by an invasion of neighboring Caribbean
states.103 Chancellor Modica, outraged by the danger to which the
invasion subjected his students, said that if any were hurt the pres-
ident "should be held accountable."1 4
Before U.S. forces approached them, students at the True
Blue campus were surrounded by combat for several hours. The
Point Salines area, where U.S. Army Rangers landed, was de-
fended by the People's Revolutionary Army of Grenada. Addition-
ally, approximately 200 of the 600 Cuban workers had light arms
and fought back following the Rangers' attack on them. The com-
bat was conducted very close to the True Blue campus. Modica
said there was firing close by.105 After initial exchange of fire on
the ground with light weapons, the Rangers relied on helicopter
gunships to combat the People's Revolutionary Army and the Cu-
ban workers. Those gunships flew over the True Blue campus and
fired at the PRA and Cubans who were still very close to the cam-
pus. One student, via ham radio, reported "quite a bit of fire" at
[Task Force] conducted operations on Lance Aux Epines peninsula to ensure the safety of
202 U.S. citizens." Commander in Chief, supra note 91, chron. 4; Wash Post, Nov. 9, 1983,
at A34, col. 1; Doe, Grenada: Will Its Lessons Be Taught?, ARMY TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1984, at 32.
101. R. GABRIEL, MILITARY INCOMPETENCE: WHY THE AMERICAN MILITARY DOESN'T WIN
174 (1985).
102. LATIN AMERICA BUREAU, supra note 78, at 89. Pastor said, "U.S. citizens were more
likely to have been endangered by the invasion than by the Grenada Government." Hearing:
U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 73. Rep. Dymally said, "The greatest danger to
American lives on Grenada was an American invasion." Id. at 7.
103. See supra text accompanying note 63.
104. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A20, col. 6. Pastor said, "The government [of Gre-
nada] would be more likely to take hostages if there were an imminent or probable invasion
than if the U.S. Government was in direct contact trying to gain assurances of safety for
U.S. citizens. So in that sense an invasion would have endangered the lives of U.S. citizens
rather than protected them." Hearing: U.S Military Actions, supra note 22, at 82.
105. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A20, col. 6.
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the campus from U.S. helicopter gunships. 106 The gunships in-
flicted heavy casualties on the Cuban workers.'0 7 While another
student was broadcasting from True Blue campus on a ham radio,
artillery fire could be heard in the background.'0 8 The student ham
radio operator sent a radio message to U.S. forces asking that the
helicopters be diverted.' 0 ' One student reported that U.S. shells
aimed at Grenadians and the Cubans landed "less than 50 meters
from our building on the campus."" 0 One student reported a bullet
hitting the pillow on his bed in his dormitory."' Additionally, the
invasion endangered students at the other locations. That was par-
ticularly true of the largest concentration of U.S. nationals on Gre-
nada, the 224 medical students at the campus at Grand Anse, lo-
cated south of the capital city of St. George's." 2 U.S. commanders
learned of the existence of the Grand Anse campus from students
at the True Blue campus."'
S
U.S. forces were unable to approach the Grand Anse campus
until the afternoon of October 26. They used helicopters to trans-
port the students to the Point Salines airstrip, where they were
transferred to C-141 transport planes and flown to the United
States. The helicopter operation was conducted when PRA forces
were actively defending the St. George's area. U.S. aircraft strafed
PRA units near the campus in a "devastating barrage" that lasted
fifteen minutes and leveled two nearby hotels." 4 The helicopters
were met with heavy fire as they flew in and out of the Grand Anse
campus. 1"' The U.S. Marine Corps report on the Grenada fighting
indicates the danger to which the students were exposed:
[L]iftoff [with students from Grand Anse] commenced at 1600
[4:00 p.m., October 26]. In less than an hour, 224 students were
evacuated under fire without any friendly casualties. Three heli-
106. Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A10, col. 2.
107. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A12, cols. 1-2.
108. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A20, col. 2.
109. Id. at A20, col. 6.
110. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A17, col. 2.
111. D-Day in Grenada, TiME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 23 [hereinafter D-Day in Grenada].
112. "Enemy forces were in control of both locations [Grand Anse, Lance aux Epines]
and could easily have killed the students." R. GABRIEL, supra note 101, at 168.
113. Commander in Chief, supra note 91, at HI-9.
114. Battle for Grenada, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1983, at 72 [hereinafter Battle for
Grenada].
115. The ground fire was sufficiently intense that several Marine helicopter pilots re-
fused to land, forcing Rangers to jump from moving helicopters. R. GABRIEL, supra note 101,
at 170. That the fighting near the medical school endangered the students is noted by Pas-
tor in Hearing: U.S Military Actions, supra note 22, at 83.
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copters were damaged in the assault with one helicopter de-
stroyed. There were no losses to passengers or crew.110
As the students ran towards the helicopters, "shots whizzed about
them."117
An army analyst wrote, "Fully 35 hours after the start of the
operation, these students [at the Grand Anse Campus] remained
surrounded by Cuban and Grenadan forces, who might easily have
slaughtered them had they been so inclined to retaliate for the in-
vasion." Senator Sam Nunn, of the Senate Armed Forces Commit-
tee, commented, "we averted a tragedy by a narrow margin." 1 8
Students in off-campus housing were in an even more precari-
ous position because U.S. forces were unaware of their locations
and thus could not take precautions to avoid combat near them.
Fighting raged around the student and faculty residences in the
hills north of Point Salinas." ' Students at the Lance aux tpines
residential area were behind Grenadian lines throughout the entire
four days of combat and were not reached by U.S. forces until Oc-
tober 28, after Grenadian resistance had been completely
subdued.12
Given what U.S. military intelligence knew about the strength
of PRA forces, foreseeably, a landing would be met with considera-
ble resistance. Unlike the evacuation of U.S. nationals from the
Dominican Republic in 1965, where evacuees were collected in a
field distant from armed conflict,12 ' the Grenada students whose
locations were known were near a defended position. There was no
possibility of landing near them without subjecting them to nearby
gunfire. The failure to ascertain the location of the other students
116. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW, supra note 96, at 18.
117. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 25. O'Shaughnessy calls the Grand Anse
evacuation "the time of maximum danger to the lives of the U.S. medical students." H.
O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at 221. The danger was heightened by the fact that the
operation involved units from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, units that had
not previously worked together. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1983, at 21, col. 1.
118. Doe, supra note 100, at 32. Doe's reference to "Cuban forces" is inaccurate. There
were no Cuban forces on Grenada in the sense of military units. The only substantial num-
ber of Cubans was the construction workers at Point Salines. Quigley, supra note 97, at 206.
That Grenadian forces could have killed the students during this period was also noted by
Illingworth, Grenada in Retrospect, in AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN GRENADA: THE IMPLICA-
TIONS OF OPERATION "URGENT FURY" 139 (1985).
119. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A17, col. 2. Bourne referred to "the 150 students
scattered around in various houses." Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 197.
120. See supra notes 100-01.
121. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1965, at Al, col. 8.
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caused them even more danger.
The likelihood that nationals will be endangered by a military
intervention is one reason to oppose a rule that permits military
intervention to protect nationals. Bennouna writes: "Dispatch of
troops into the territory of another country is far from the most
effective means to protect foreign nationals; it contributes, most
often, to aggravating the situation, to exciting passions, and in the
end to putting their lives in actual danger. '
The danger to which the U.S. nationals were subjected be-
cause of the invasion of Grenada indicates that if the State De-
partment was sincerely concerned for the safety of the U.S. nation-
als, it would not have launched an invasion but would have
arranged their evacuation without use of military force. The fact
that peaceful avenues for achieving that evacuation were not ex-
plored suggests that safe evacuation of U.S. nationals was not an
objective of the October 25 landing.
K. The People's Revolutionary Army Did not Harm U.S.
Nationals During the Hostilities
One reason given by the State Department to justify an evacu-
ation of U.S. nationals was the fear that the RMC might take U.S.
nationals hostage. 123 Yet when hostilities commenced, the PRA
showed the same solicitude to U.S. nationals that it had shown in
the days preceding the invasion. No U.S. national was taken hos-
tage by or harmed by the PRA, though it had considerable oppor-
tunity to do so. This was particularly true of the 224 medical stu-
dents at the Grand Anse campus who were not approached by U.S.
forces until October 26,124 and the 202 students at the Lance aux
Epines residential area who were not evacuated until October 28.125
The PRA, which could not hold out long against a U.S. invasion,
might have taken U.S. nationals as hostages in a last-ditch effort to
stave off defeat. Thus, had the PRA been inclined to take hostages,
the U.S. invasion provided it with the ideal situation.
Only two instances of contact were reported between PRA
122. M. BENNOUNA, supra note 20, at 181.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
124. One author writes, "It is not clear to this day why Grenadian troops ... did not
take the medical students hostage at Grand Anse." P. BRAESTRUP, BATTLE LINES: REPORT OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE MILITARY AND THE MEDIA 108 (1985).
125. Supra notes 100-01.
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soldiers and medical students during the fighting. In one, PRA
soldiers by mistake burst into a house in which six medical stu-
dents were living. When the soldiers realized that the inhabitants
were medical students, they apologized and left. 2 ' One student
who lived off-campus reported that thirty PRA soldiers entered
the apartment he shared with four other students and took it over
for three hours for use as a communications station. The soldiers
did not harm the students."i 7 Military analyst Richard Gabriel
wrote: "According to the students themselves [those at Grand
Anse], they never felt in any danger until the Americans arrived
and it looked as if there might be a battle. No threats were ever
made against either the students or the medical-school staff. In-
deed, if the enemy had wanted to kill the students or hold them
hostage, they had two full days to do so after the first American
forces landed." ''
L. Rescue of Nationals was a Pretext
One cannot fully assess the hypothesis that the rescue of U.S.
nationals was a pretext without analyzing what motivation the
United States might have had for wanting to change the Govern-
ment of Grenada. That analysis is undertaken in the next section,
in the context of U.S.-OECS relations. However, even without that
analysis, the above strongly suggests that the State Department
did not invade Grenada to protect U.S. nationals. Former Attorney
General Ramsey Clark said that the Administration made a "false
claim" when it asserted that intervention was necessary to save the
students.' 2 ' Representative Peter Kostmayer told his colleagues on
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "I have not seen a single
shred of evidence that the lives of American citizens were in dan-
ger in Grenada." 1 0 Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., concluded,
126. J. KWITNY, supra note 25, at 417. Bourne said the soldiers told the six students
that they would protect them. He said, "the word had gotten to the PRA [People's Revolu-
tionary Army] that they were not to interfere with the students." Hearing: US. Military
Actions, supra note 22, at 178.
127. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 24.
128. R. GABRIEL, supra note 101, at 169. Pastor said, "there were ample opportunities
after the invasion for them [the Grenada army] to take hostages and, of course, none were
taken." Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 73.
129. Clark, Libya, Grenada, and Reagan, 242 NATION 604, 605 (1986).
130. Grenada War Powers: Full Compliance Reporting and Implementation, Markup
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983). Sally
Shelton, who was U.S. Ambassador to Grenada, Barbados, and other Eastern Caribbean
states 1979-1981, said of the claim of danger to the students that there was "no supporting
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"It did not want evacuation. It wanted a pretext for war."13' The
invasion in fact seriously endangered U.S. nationals and other for-
eign nationals, and the State Department knew in advance that it
would. Although the Department could have evacuated U.S. na-
tionals before invading, nationals were left in Grenada and exposed
to serious danger to provide a pretext for the invasion and over-
throw of the government. State Department personnel failed to ar-
range for the evacuation of U.S. nationals even after some of them
decided they wanted to leave. Even if the U.S. nationals were in
danger, that danger was seriously increased by the invasion itself.
Logically, it would have been safer to arrange transport.
"The rescue operation," concluded Gabriel, "would be used as
the public rationale for the invasion, but in fact its objectives went
considerably beyond. . . .What the U.S. planned was nothing less
than taking over the island and installing a regime more friendly to
American interests.'
'1 82
This was not the first time the State Department asserted a
need to rescue endangered U.S. nationals as a pretext for military
intervention in the Caribbean. In 1965 it intervened in the Domini-
can Republic on the pretext of a need to rescue U.S. nationals. The
following facts indicate that the rescue of U.S. nationals from the
Dominican Republic was a pretext: (1) two days before the inter-
vention the U.S. embassy in the Dominican Republic sent the
State Department a cable suggesting intervention to ensure the de-
feat of the constitutionally elected government of Juan Bosch
which was overthrown by military coup: "All members of the coun-
try team feel Bosch's return and resumption of control of the gov-
ernment is against U.S. interests in view of extremists in the coup
and Communist advocacy of Bosch's return"; (2) the information
that the U.S. ambassador provided to the State Department re-
garding the unsafe condition of U.S. nationals was provided by
evidence as yet." Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 58 (statement of former
Ambassador Sally Shelton). Representative Dymally said that, "the claims that our students
were in danger were spurious at best." Id. at 6.
131. Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1983, at 30, col. 4. Accord Holt, Christian Science Monitor,
Dec. 7, 1983, at 34, col. 3 (Holt is the former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee). See also statement of Robert Pastor that, "the Reagan administration did not
want to receive information about the students from their parents, or from the Grenadian
Government unless that information reinforced their own fear they were in danger. More
importantly, the Reagan administration did not seek out such information." Hearing: U.S.
Military Actions, supra note 22, at 83. See also id. at 234 (statement of Colin Moore, "the
security of the American students was merely a pretext for the invasion.").
132. R. GABRIEL, supra note 101, at 151.
[Vol. 18:2
U.S. INVASION OF GRENADA
pro-U.S. Dominican military officers; (3) those officers stating they
could not assure safety of U.S. nationals were not in a position to
do so as they were not at that time in power, controlling only an
air base east of the capital city; (4) on the day preceding the inter-
vention 1172 of the 2500 U.S. nationals in the Dominican Republic
were evacuated by ship and helicopter without use of force; (5) af-
ter intervening the U.S. forces only evacuated an additional 200
U.S. nationals; (6) there was no indication that those 200 nationals
could not have been evacuated by the same means used to evacu-
ate the 1172; (7) neither before nor after the intervention was any
harm done to the persons or property of U.S. nationals.'
The Dominican Republic and Grenada episodes are the only
two recent U.S. interventions in the Caribbean where the justifica-
tion given was the rescue of U.S. nationals. In both instances, the
assertion was a pretext for an intervention effectuated to remove a
government. Fearful that the rescue-of-nationals rationale would
be used as a pretext, the Organization of American States (OAS)
included a provision in the OAS Charter that precludes interven-
tion for any purpose whatever, including rescue of nationals.""
Whatever may be the customary international law on the topic,""5
with respect to the Western Hemisphere, rescue of nationals is pre-
cluded by OAS Charter article 18, which states that "No State...
has the right to intervene . . . for any reason whatever, in the in-
ternal . . . affairs of any other State," and article 20, which states
that "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the ob-
ject, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures
of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever." The pretextual use of the rescue-of-nationals
rationale in the Dominican Republic and Grenada invasions illus-
trates the wisdom of the OAS Charter provisions. It also demon-
strates the need to limit that doctrine under customary law to fore-
stall such uses of the doctrine by states intervening for other
purposes.
The hypothesis should also be considered that the State De-
partment honestly believed that the U.S. nationals in Grenada
133. On the facts, see 2 A. CHAYEs, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELO, INTERNATIONAL LErAL
PROCESS 1152-57 (1968), and sources cited therein. For agreement with the statement in the
text that protection of nationals was a pretext, see M. BENNOUNA, supra note 20, at 180.
134. Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 95,
109 (H. Bull ed. 1984).
135. Akehurst cites extensive state practice to make a convincing case that customary
law does not permit force to protect nationals abroad. See id.
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were in imminent danger and that a military operation was the
best way to extract them from that danger. Because there is little
evidence of such a danger, the author views this only as a remote
possibility.
Administration officials claimed that the taking of hostages at
the U.S. Embassy in Iran in 1979 made them fearful of a similar
action in Grenada.18 6 This mind-set may have inclined the Depart-
ment to view situations of unrest as potential hostage situations
even where little such potential exists. The fact that the Depart-
ment exacerbated whatever danger existed may be explained by
ineptitude, by the haste with which the operation was planned,
and by the difficulties of coordinating the activities of the four ser-
vices involved in the operation.
If the Department genuinely believed that an invasion was the
best means possible to protect U.S. nationals, further doubt is cast
on the rescue-of-nationals justification. An inherent danger in im-
plementation of the rescue-of-nationals justification is that the in-
tervening state makes a unilateral decision of the necessity to in-
tervene. But if an intervening state honestly concludes there is
danger where none exists, based on misperception of international
situations, then the rescue-of-nationals justification is more sus-
pect still. A government could intervene in the most innocuous of
situations, sincerely believing its nationals were in danger.
This problem is particularly acute for the United States in the
contemporary period. Considering the extent to which the United
States is unpopular in many Third World states, it is very likely
that any group challenging a Third World government friendly to
the United States will criticize the United States. If civil warfare
develops in such a state, the State Department may view U.S. na-
tionals resident there as potential hostages.
The potential for abuse of the rescue-of-nationals justification
is magnified by the fact that public opinion in the United States
may well share the State Department's view of the danger of hos-
tage-taking. Thus, it may support military intervention based on
that justification. The State Department's awareness of this fact
encourages the State Department to intervene in situations where
the Department believes (honestly but erroneously) that U.S. na-
tionals are in danger.
136. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 44.
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With Grenada, it is more likely, as concluded above, that the
State Department knew there was no imminent danger to U.S. citi-
zens and used that rationale as a pretext for an invasion to change
the Government of Grenada.
V. SECOND JUSTIFICATION: REQUEST FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF
EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES
A second ground asserted by the State Department to justify
the Grenada intervention was that the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS) requested the United States to inter-
vene. The Department stated that the OECS is a regional organi-
zation that has the power under its constituent treaty to take mili-
tary action in Grenada (a member of the OECS) under the
circumstances present in Grenada; that the OECS asked the
United States for assistance in that endeavor; that the OECS had
the right to make that request to the United States; and that the
United States had the right to respond affirmatively.
A. The OECS Did Not Act for the Reasons It Asserted
The OECS statement gave three reasons for the OECS re-
questing United States intervention in Grenada: (1) deterioration
of public order; (2) suppression of the population by the RMC; and
(3) the threat to OECS member states from "the extensive military
buildup in Grenada over the last few years" that had created "a
situation of disproportionate military strength between Grenada
and other OECS countries. This military strength in the hands of
the present group has posed a serious threat to the security of the
OECS countries and other neighboring states. 187
Indicating why it decided to act, the OECS emphasized the
regional threat over the other two concerns: "Member governments
considered it of the utmost urgency that immediate steps should
be taken to remove this threat." It characterized its action as "a
preemptive defensive strike in order to remove this dangerous
threat to peace and security." The OECS added that it was being
undertaken as well "to establish a situation of normalcy in Gre-
nada," an evident reference to the other two concerns (deteriora-
tion of public order and suppression of the Grenadian population
by the RMC).
137. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 67-68.
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It is doubtful that this OECS statement expresses the real rea-
sons the OECS decided to act. The alleged concern over Grenadian
military strength is suspect because the accession to power of the
RMC meant that Grenada was no longer on good terms with Cuba.
Much of this concern over the Grenadian military buildup in pub-
lic statements had been premised on Cuba's military assistance to
Grenada. But after the RMC took power, it was doubtful that Gre-
nada would continue military collaboration with Cuba. Cuba re-
fused the RMC's request to help defend Grenada against the antic-
ipated U.S. invasion-an indication of the lack of military
cooperation between Cuba and the RMC.'3s
A more likely motive for the OECS action was the fear of left-
ist forces coming to power elsewhere in the Caribbean. At their
October 21 meeting, OECS leaders "expressed the fear that the
bloody leftist military takeover on Grenada could embolden Ha-
vana-leaning revolutionaries in their own nations."'"" St. Lucia
Prime Minister John Compton feared Grenada would push the
Caribbean into the socialist camp."10 Jamaican Prime Minister Ed-
ward Seaga voiced similar fears (Jamaica participated with Barba-
dos as non-OECS states calling for U.S. intervention in Grenada).
Ambassador Kirkpatrick quoted the following statement by Seaga
as the reason why both Jamaica and the United States "accede[d]
to the request of the OECS for assistance in its effort to establish
collective security for the region." Seaga stated:
It is the inescapable fact that revolution breeds revolution
because it makes no allowance to institutionalize opposition and
to change administrations peacefully. During the past week we
witnessed in Grenada not only a revolution spawning its own de-
struction but a brutal military takeover of a civilian
Government.
It may be felt that these matters do not concern us, but
most certainly they do. If a whole Government can be wiped out
138. Note of Cuban Government to Revolutionary Military Council of Grenada, read by
President Fidel Castro at press conference, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A10, col. 4. On the
poor relations between the RMC and Cuba, see H. O'SHAUGHNESSy, GRENADA: REVOLUTION,
INVASION AND AFrERMATH 148-150 (1984)[hereinafter H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, INVASION].
139. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 27. Pastor said that the OECS leaders de-
cided, "that a Marxist military government in the eastern Caribbean was unacceptable."
Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 85 (statement of R. Pastor).
140. St. Lucia Prime Minister John Compton, who evidently was a prime mover behind
the OECS action, feared that Grenada would push the Caribbean into the socialist camp. G.
SANDFORD, supra, note 80, at 2.
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overnight, by either political or military extremists and the Gov-
ernments of the Caribbean remain silent and passive, then no
Government elected by the people can be safe from madmen of
one type or another who would seek to replace a Government of
the people, elected by the people, with one selected by which-
ever chosen few of whatever nature.
If we ignored the occurrence of brutal military takeovers or
political overthrows of Government, we would immediately give
heart to every subversive group within the region to engineer
disorder and instability as a means of overthrow. No democratic
system of government would have a chance of carrying out the
programmes of development which it was elected to implement
if, in its midst, was a group of subversives, anarchists, terrorists,
bent on destruction of the foundations of stability which under-
pin the whole system of democracy. The far-reaching conse-
quences of such neglect on our part would be awesome and
would have the effect of creating an unsure and an insecure fu-
ture for all of us.
For the sake of the democratic system of government which
we all agree to be the one which allows the maximum freedom of
choice to peoples and protects their right to elect a government
of their choice, we cannot ignore the events in the English-
speaking Caribbean.""1
Seaga expressed concern not over possible military action by Gre-
nada against other Caribbean states but over possible domestic po-
litical repercussions in the Caribbean states because of the domes-
tic political changes in Grenada. He was evidently worried that
there might be leftist takeovers of government in other Caribbean
states and strongly suggested that this was the primary reason for
supporting the Grenada intervention. Kirkpatrick cited the Seaga
statement as "the best justification" for the decision by both Ja-
maica and the United States to intervene in Grenada, implying
that this was the primary reason the United States intervened in
Grenada.
The OECS member states governed with the exception of Gre-
nada, by governments of the political center or right, were alarmed
by the New Jewel Movement that assumed power in Grenada in
1979, fearing its possible demonstration effect in their own popula-
tions. The governments cooperating with the United States in Gre-
nada were "only the closest allies of the United States in the re-
141. See Collective Action, supra note 7, at 76 (Kirkpatrick).
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gion, those Commonwealth Caribbean countries with the most
right-wing governments."' 42 The existence of a leftist government
in Grenada gave courage to leftists in their own states. The weak-
ening of the Grenadian New Jewel Movement resulting from the
anti-Bishop takeover by other New Jewel Movement members pro-
vided the OECS states with an opportunity to eliminate a leftist
government in Grenada. In the weeks following their action in Gre-
nada, several OECS governments arrested leading leftist figures in
their own states. This suggests that the OECS governments' pri-
mary aim was to put down leftism in the Caribbean."' One news-
paper reported that, "A climate of militant antiradicalism-even
vigilantism-is rising here in the Caribbean in the wake of the
United States-Caribbean invasion of Grenada.' 1  Leftists were in-
terrogated and their homes searched in Barbados. Jamaican Prime
Minister Seaga read in Parliament the names of twenty-five per-
sons he called "security risks."'14 5
B. The Reasons the OECS Asserted Were Legally Insuffi-
cient Under the OECS Treaty
The reasons the 0ECS stated are legally insufficient even as-
suming their factual validity. The 1981 OECS treaty does not per-
mit military intervention to restore order in a member state whose
internal mechanisms have broken down. Article 8 of that treaty is
the only provision providing for military intervention. Article 8 es-
tablishes and describes the functions of the OECS Defence and Se-
curity Committee, identified by article 5 as a principal institution
of the OECS. Article 8, paragraph 4, states, in part:
The Defence and Security Committee shall have responsibility
for coordinating the efforts of Member States for collective de-
142. A. PAYNE, supra note 21, at 156. Professor A.W. Singham, Dept. of Political Sci-
ence, Brooklyn College, referred to the leaders of three states that participated in the Gre-
nada action as being "part and parcel of an ideological mold which is known in the eastern
Caribbean as the New Right." Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 125 (state-
ment of Prof. A.W. Singham).
143. Trinidad opposed the invasion, apparently because of opposition to it in the
Trinidadian Left. Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 4, 1983, at 10, col. 1. Shortly after the
invasion, Seaga also expelled four Soviet diplomats and the only Cuban government-related
person in Jamaica, a correspondent for the Cuban news service, Prensa Latina, alleging that
the five had plotted to kill a Jamaican foreign ministry official. Cuba on the Defensive,
TIME, Nov. 14, 1983, at 31.
144. Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
145. Id.
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fence and the preservation of peace and security against exter-
nal aggression.1 4 8
External aggression is the only circumstance that can trigger mili-
tary action by OECS member states under the 1981 OECS treaty.
A situation of disorder in a member state is not "external aggres-
sion." Similarly, protecting the rights of the Grenadian people is
not a valid justification for intervention by the OECS. Lack of
human rights by the population of a member state is not consid-
ered "external aggression." Likewise, the alleged fears over the
possibility of Grenadian military action against other OECS states
cannot trigger military action under the OECS treaty. "External
aggression" requires aggression, not just a fear of future military
action, ' 7 and also requires that the aggression come from outside
the OECS. Because Grenada is a member state of the OECS, even
an actual aggressive armed attack by it against another OECS
state would not constitute "external aggression."
The 1981 OECS treaty does not provide a basis for the OECS
action in Grenada for an additional reason-Article 8 requires a
unanimous vote of member states before initiating military action.
Article 8, paragraph 5, states, in part: "The decisions and direc-
tives of the Defence and Security Committee shall be unanimous
. . ." Since Article 8, paragraph 1, defines the Committee as con-
sisting of ministers responsible for defense "of the Member
States," a representative of each member state must vote in favor
of a resolution calling for military action. Grenada was not repre-
sented at the October 21 meeting when the decision to intervene
was made. The other six members voted in favor.
1 48
Most commentators on the OECS role in the Grenada inter-
vention concluded that these two factors represent fatal defects to
the State Department's reliance on the OECS treaty as a justifica-
146. Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, June 18, 1981,
20 I.L.M. 1166 (1981).
147. The Legal Adviser disavowed the anticipatory self-defense justification given by
the OECS. See infra note 208.
148. One press report said that Montaerrat and St. Kitts-Nevis had abstained. This
report was, according to its author Stuart Taylor, based on a statement by a State Depart-
ment official in a private conversation not for attribution. Telephone interview with Stuart
Taylor (Aug. 1, 1985). However, officials of both Montserrat and St. Kitts-Nevis have told
the author that these two members voted in the affirmative on the October 21 OECS deci-
sion to request U.S. intervention in Grenada. Telephone interview with William Valentine
Herbert, Ambassador of St. Kitts-Nevis to the United States (Aug. 23, 1985). Telephone
interview with Jane Higgs, political officer at the British Embassy, Washington, D.C., Aug.
2, 1985 (Montserrat is a British dependency).
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tion for United States intervention.1 4 9
C. The United States Prompted the OECS Decision to Re-
quest the United States to Intervene
The State Department claims that the United States acted in
response to the OECS request of October 21; however, it is more
likely that the United States solicited the OECS request. Four fac-
tors support this conclusion: (1) the OECS States are not capable
of significant military action; (2) no troops from any OECS mem-
ber state participated in the invasion of October 25, 1983; (3) U.S.
officials discussed with Caribbean leaders the possibility of military
action against Grenada well in advance of the October 21 OECS
decision; and (4) the OECS request to the United States was
drafted by the State Department.
1. The OECS States Have Little Military Capability
Several OECS states have virtually no military organization;
others have only a small number of troops. 50 Thus, a decision by
the OECS for military intervention would be meaningless absent
prior agreement from states with military capability to carry it out.
Three non-OECS States were involved: Jamaica, Barbados, and
the United States. Of the three, the United States was the only one
capable of effective assistance because Jamaica's and Barbados'
military organizations are small."'1 The OECS would not have
149. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM J. INT'L L. 131, 136-37
(1984); Boyle, supra note 10, at 173. Karas & Goodman, supra note 11, at 85-86; Dore, The
U.S. Invasion of Grenada: Resurrection of the "Johnson Doctrine'? 20 STAN. J. INT'L L.
173, 183-84 (1984); Action in Grenada, supra note 12, at 345; W. GiLMORE, supra note 11, at
43-44. Contra Moore, supra note 13, at 163-64; Riggs, supra note 13, at 51-53.
150. Kirkpatrick told the Security Council that most OECS states have no army or
armies of less than 200 men. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 75. Deputy Secretary of
State Dam said, "none of them [QECS states] have an organized military force; they have
constabular forces, constables." Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra, note 15, at 8.
Maj. Gen. George Crist, U.S. Marine Corps, who was in charge of liaison with the Caribbean
contingents, stated, "When I first met them, which was at about it o'clock on a Sunday
night at the Barbados defense headquarters . . . they said we are very small countries. We
do not have military forces. We are basically police. And there they are with weapons,
troops. They have murdered their leaders. What can we do? Can you help us?" Hearing:
U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 42 (statement of Maj. Gen. George Crist, U.S.
Marine Corps).
151. On October 15, Barbados Prime Minister Tom Adams had asked for U.S. military
intervention in Grenada-an indication that he did not think the Caribbean states could do
it alone. The request was reported in a cable to the State Dept. from U.S. Ambassador
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taken its October 21 decision absent a prior agreement from the
United States to send troops into Grenada. U.S. Ambassador to
Barbados, Milan Bish, was in close contact with the OECS confer-
ees in Georgetown, and, by some accounts, even attended their
meetings. 52 Barbados, Jamaica, and the OECS states knew of Rea-
gan's antipathy to Grenada and his likely willingness to accept a
request for intervention.'"
2. No OECS or Other Caribbean Troops Took Part in Combat in
Grenada
The Administration repeatedly referred to a "multinational
force" despite the fact that no OECS or other Caribbean troops
took part in combat in Grenada. This suggests that the Adminis-
tration was using OECS participation as cover for a U.S.-initiated
operation."4
President Reagan, announcing the invasion on October 25, at
9:00 a.m., gave the impression that Caribbean troops were part of
the initial invasion force:
We acceded to the request to become part of a multinational
effort with contingents from Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados,
Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
and the United States .... Early this morning, forces from six
Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing
or landings on the island of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean. 15
As Reagan spoke, no Caribbean personnel had arrived in Grenada.
Similarly, J. William Middendorf, U.S. Ambassador to the Organi-
zation of American States, told the OAS Permanent Council on
October 26:
[A] collective security force, made up of contingents from four
member states of the OECS-Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica,
Milan Bish in Barbados. See Bennett, Grenada: Anatomy of a "Go" Decision, READER'S
DIGEST, Feb. 1984, at 72, 73. That Barbados knew it needed extra-Caribbean assistance for a
Grenada invasion was reported to the Canadian External Affairs Ministry October 21 by
Noble Power, Canadian High Commissioner in Barbados. Power reported that the Barbados
Government wanted an invasion but considered it "unrealistic" without outside support.
Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 17, 1983, at 2, col. 2.
152. A- PAYNE:, supra note 21, at 149.
153. Id.
154. For a description of the personnel provided by the participating states, see H.
O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at 8-9.
155. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 67.
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St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, supplemented by
units from Barbados, Jamaica, and the United
States-disembarked on Grenada yesterday at dawn.' 8
In fact, only 300 Caribbean troops were flown into Grenada on Oc-
tober 25, beginning mid-afternoon, 1 7 and they were assigned only
two duties-civilian police work and guarding of detainees.1 8  They
were never intended to and did not engage in combat.1 e There are
no reports of any deaths or injuries among them.
Reagan and Middendorf must have known that Caribbean
forces had not landed at dawn and were not to have a combat role.
Middendorf's statement is particularly disingenuous. He implies
that the bulk of the force was OECS, because he claims that an
OECS force was "supplemented" by units from Barbados, Jamaica,
and the United States.6 0 In fact there were several thousand U.S.
troops. Of the 300 Caribbean personnel, 150 were Jamaican, and
the other 150 were from Barbados and the OECS states com-
bined.1 61 The OECS personnel were not even military units but ci-
vilian police. Deputy Secretary of State Dam accurately described
them to a Senate committee as "constables."' 1
In principle, there is no reason why the operation could have
been accomplished without Caribbean forces participating. If it is
lawful for the United States to respond to an OECS request, U.S.
forces alone could carry out the operation. But the fact that the
Administration found it necessary to lie about Caribbean partici-
pation suggests that the Administration knew that it was on thin
legal grounds and tried to make the operation seem something dif-
ferent from what it was.
156. Id. at 72.
157. Guardian, Oct. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (quoting Secretary of State Shultz). The Joint
Chiefs of Staff stated that the first U.S. troop transport planes arrived at 2:05 p.m. carrying
82nd Airborne Division personnel. The Caribbean forces were evidently flown in some time
later in the afternoon. JCS Replies, supra note 97, at 32.
158. Drew Middleton, in N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A12, col. 1. Jamaican Prime
Minister Edward Seaga said the Jamaican troops were helping guard prisoners. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 28, 1983, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A12, col. 5. See photograph of
Barbadian soldier guarding Cuban detainees in N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at A22. The role
of the Caribbean personnel as guards and police is indicated as well in Operational Over-
view, supra note 96, at 23.
159. Halliday, An Ambiguous Turning Point: Grenada and Its Aftermath, in NORTH
AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMEmCA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS, Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 20, 21.
160. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 72.
161. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at All, col. 4.
162. Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 43.
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3. U.S. Officials Discussed Possible Military Action in Grenada
with Caribbean Leaders
Senior Jamaican officials said that the OECS request to the
U.S. was made only after the United States indicated willingness
to respond affirmatively.163 According to these officials, for several
months prior to October 1983 U.S. officials tried to convince Carib-
bean leaders to take military action against Grenada.0 4 Barbados
Prime Minister Tom Adams said that on October 15 "an official of
the [Barbados] Ministry of Defense and Security reported to me
that he had been tentatively approached by a United States official
about the prospect of rescuing Maurice Bishop from his captors
and had been made an offer of transport."' 5 Adams said that this
possibility was taken up by the Barbados Government, and that on
October 19 the cabinet decided "to proceed with a rescue plan, in
collaboration with eastern Caribbean countries and larger non-Car-
ibbean countries with the resources necessary to carry out such an
intricate operation."'0 0 Thus, the Barbados cabinet's decision on
October 19 was based on a U.S. inquiry, indicating the seriousness
with which the Barbados government took the October 15
communication.
The State Department denied approaching any Barbados offi-
cial to suggest military action in Grenada, but acknowledged con-
tact with Caribbean leaders around October 15 over the possibility
of military intervention in Grenada. The Department claimed,
163. Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1983, at A20, col. 1. As to whether the United States
prompted the request, one author concludes, "[W]e are unlikely to know the truth until all
the records are made public." Levitin, supra note 11, at 648.
164. Id. See Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A10, col. 4.
165. Transcript of Adams radio-television address of Oct. 26, 1983, at 1 [hereinafter
Adams Transcript]. The transcript was made available to the A.B.A. committee studying
the Grenada invasion by the State Department. Action in Grenada, supra note 12, at 342.
Excerpts appear in W. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 102-105. Adams' reference to an October
15 U.S. approach was reported in Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1983, at A14, col. 2; London Times,
Oct. 28, 1983, at 5, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A16, col. 1. The U.S. official was
reportedly from the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Barbados. LATIN AMERICA BUREAU, supra
note 78, at 80. U.S. officials have acknowledged discussing with Caribbean leaders the possi-
bility of military action in Grenada as early as October 15. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at Al,
col. 7. Rep. Dymally stated, "The suggestion that the invasion was conceived by the OECS
is not exactly correct. An emissary from the State Department traveled to Barbados, prior
to the meeting of the OECS ministers, with a memorandum suggesting that a U.S. invasion
was a possibility." Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 3.
166. Adams Transcript, supra note 165, at 2. It is not clear what the Barbados cabinet
meant by "rescue of Bishop." Given Adams' evident apprehension about the forces that had
detained Bishop, it likely included removing them from power.
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however, that the approach came from the (unnamed) Caribbean
leaders. It said the approaches "took the form of Caribbean leaders
relaying to us through normal diplomatic channels their increasing
concerns and apprehensions about the breakdown of order and
growing violence and their belief that direct action might be neces-
sary to prevent more deaths by a tyrannical, illegal government."' 7
Jamaica Prime Minister Seaga said that State Department of-
ficials were involved in discussions with Caribbean officials about
Grenada prior to October 21. He denied, however, that the Depart-
ment prompted the Caribbean nations to request U.S. interven-
tion. He said that a State Department official "added to the con-
cern over the turn of events in Grenada and the expanding Cuban
and Soviet influence on the island."'168
On October 20, according to Adams, he was approached by
Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia (an OECS member),
who suggested "a Caribbean initiative to intervene in Grenada on a
multi-national basis to restore law and order and to lead the coun-
try to an early election." 1" Adams took that suggestion to the Bar-
bados cabinet, which voted in favor that same day. The OECS met
in the evening of October 21 and decided to intervene in Grenada
and to ask the United States, Barbados, and Jamaica to
participate.
Prior to that meeting the State Department seriously consid-
ered intervention to replace the RMC. A 5:00 p.m. White House
meeting chaired by Rear Admiral Poindexter (former assistant to
National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane) considered the pos-
sibility of seizing the island.17
0
No U.S. official attended the October 21 OECS meeting, held
at the Dover Convention Center in Bridgetown, Barbados. How-
ever, Charles A. Gillespie, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Caribbean Affairs, waited in an anteroom outside the meeting
room.' 7 1 The presence of such a high State Department official
167. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983, at A10, col. 2. Deputy Secretary of State Dam denied
any U.S. prompting: "There were no authorized discussions between the U.S. Government
and officials of any Caribbean or Central American country regarding the need for military
actions on Grenada before the request for assistance from the OECS nations on October
21." Hearing. U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 51.
168. Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1983 at All, col. 4. In the same interview Seaga indicated
concern about being considered a U.S. puppet. Id., at col. 5.
169. Adams Transcript, supra note 165, at 3.
170. Bennett, supra note 151, at 74.
171. Id.
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must, at the least, have indicated to the OECS states that the De-
partment was interested in the outcome of the meeting. Gillespie
and Bish were apparently kept apprised of the discussion, for Bish
took action when one OECS representative balked at the invasion
plan. During the discussion Lester Bird, Foreign Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda, objected to an
invasion. Bish phoned Bird's father, Antigua and Barbuda Prime
Minister Vere Bird, and reportedly persuaded him that an invasion
would be advisable. 172
The contacts between U.S. and Caribbean officials prior to and
on October 21 indicate that the OECS acted in the belief that the
U.S. would favorably respond. O'Shaughnessy concluded that the
OECS decision was taken "on the basis of the State Department's
willingness to invade.' 17 While at least most of the OECS mem-
bers were quite willing to call for an invasion and were not coerced
into doing so, they would not have done so absent assurances that
the United States would welcome such a request.
4. The United States Drafted the OECS Request for U.S.
Intervention.
A final indication that the United States prompted the OECS
decision is that it drafted the written request in which the OECS
asked for U.S. military intervention in Grenada. The New York
Times reported that the request was "drafted in Washington and
conveyed to the Caribbean leaders by special American emissa-
172. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at 159. Pastor concluded that the State
Deptartment encouraged the OECS to ask it to invade. "I do not think that the U.S. forced
the OECS to make the request ...the U.S. did not encourage the OECS governments to
consider other options. By diverting the fleet, the United States provided a dramatic dem-
onstration of its seriousness and of the availability of the military option. Did the U.S. dis-
courage consideration of other options? Right after the establishment of the RMC, Milton
Cato, the Prime Minister of St. Vincent, offered to meet with Hudson Austin, and Austin
immediately accepted, but the meeting was never held. Who discouraged Cato, and why?"
U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 85-86. And further: "[T]he sending of the fleet and
a number of other acts contributed to shaping the environment, and may have encouraged
them to think perhaps more aggressively than they would have if we hadn't diverted these
ships. It may have discouraged them from looking to other alternatives." Id. at 125. St.
Lucia denied that the U.S. had suggested the OECS action. Acta de la sesibn ex-
traordinaria, supra note 42, at 23 (statement of Charles Flemming).
173. H. O'SHAuGHlNSSY, supra note 52, at 165. Former Ambassador Shelton claimed
that the OECS states "may not have been quite so likely to take the unprecedented initia-
tive of appealing for a U.S. invasion if the United States had not made it clear to them
subtly, or perhaps not quite so subtly, that it would be responsive to such a request." U.S.
Military Actions, supra note 22, at 125.
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ries' ' on October 23, when U.S. Ambassador Frank McNeil flew
to Barbados to confer with Charles and get her signature on a writ-
ten request.175 U.S. drafting of the request does not negate the
OECS desire for intervention. However, it does show a strong U.S.
role in the process by which the OECS made its request.
The United States was highly motivated to urge the OECS to
request intervention in Grenada. Even prior to the October 23 kill-
ing of Marines in Beirut, Lebanon, the Administration was anxious
for an opportunity to live up to its strong anti-communist rheto-
ric.'7 6  The Administration viewed United States interests as
threatened by Third World disorders, which it saw as encouraged
by a U.S. disinclination to use force. Thus, it sought to rekindle in
the Third World the fear that the United States was prepared to
use force to protect its interests. 177 The Administration was looking
"for any opportunity that came along where we could take a direct
punch at the other side's nose with maximum chance of success
and minimum risk of tangling with the Soviets themselves."''
"Grenada provided that opportunity.' 7 9 Moreover, Reagan had re-
cently indicated that the leftist government of Grenada was a stra-
174. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at A20, col. 1.
175. Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 5 (remarks of Deputy Secre-
tary of State Dam).
176. Richard Gabriel quotes an unidentified C.I.A. official as saying, "This Administra-
tion came to power with the intention of punching someone in the nose." R. GABRIEL, supra
note 101, at 150.
177. Klare, Grenada Syndrome, NATION, Nov. 12, 1983, at 453.
178. Weighing the Proper Role, TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 44. TIME did not name the offi-
cial. Colin Moore stated, "The basic reason for the U.S. invasion of Grenada is America's
continuing fear of and hostility to socialist regimes, whether democratic or Marxist." Hear-
ing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 237.
179. TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 44. The Nation concluded that the killing of Bishop "pro-
vided the excuse for Reagan to militarize the Caribbean and orchestrate an ideological con-
frontation with global implications." NATION, Nov. 5, 1983, at 420. Rep. Dymally: "Is it not
ironic that as soon as Maurice Bishop had been overthrown and killed, we suddenly decided
that our vital interests were at stake in Grenada?" Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra
note 22, at 6. Pastor stated: "[T]he Reagan Administration had come to that judgment [that
a Marxist military government in the eastern Caribbean was unacceptable] long before, but
had recognized that it could not take action without the acquiescence or support of the
eastern Caribbean nations." Id. at 85. Pastor further claimed: "The U.S. chose to respond to
the request for military action by the OECS rather than the diplomatic-political strategy
agreed to by the larger, 13-nation CARICOM [Caribbean Common Market] . . . . the Ad-
ministration was delighted with the opportunity to change the Grenadian government by
force." Id. at 101. The Toronto Globe and Mail summarized to this effect the opinion of
Caribbeans in Canada: "Most West Indian Expatriates believed the United States, long
wanting an excuse for invading Grenada, had found an opportunity and exploited it with
the complicity of weak Caribbean governments." Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 12, 1983, at
20, col. 2.
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tegic threat to the United States. In a March 23, 1983, televised
address on military policy, Reagan had displayed an aerial photo-
graph of the airport under construction at Point Salines. He said:
On the small island Of Grenada . . . the Cubans, with Soviet
financing and backing, are in the process of building an airfield
with a 10,000-foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air
force. Who is it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important
passageway for our international commerce and military lines of
communication. More than half of all American oil imports now
pass through the Caribbean. The rapid build-up of Grenada's
military potential is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this
island country of under 110,000 people, and totally at odds with
the pattern of other eastern Caribbean States, most of which are
unarmed. The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short,
can only be seen as power projection into the region... so
Reagan's attention to Grenada in an address on U.S. military pol-
icy in general indicates the importance he attributed to it. He gave
no other area of the world such detailed treatment in that address.
Before a joint session of Congress on Central America and
Caribbean policy, Reagan referred back to the photographs of the
Point Salines airport and suggested its usage as a refueling base for
Nicaragua-bound planes:
Because of its importance, the Caribbean Basin is a magnet
for adventurism. We are all aware of the Libyan cargo planes
refueling in Brazil a few days ago on their way to deliver medical
supplies to Nicaragua. Brazilian authorities discovered the so-
called medical supplies were actually munitions and prevented
their delivery. You may remember that last month, speaking on
national television, I showed an aerial photo of an airfield being
built on the island of Grenada. Well, if that airfield had been
completed, those planes could have refueled there and com-
pleted their journey. If the Nazis during World War II and the
Soviet today could recognize the Caribbean and Central America
as vital to our interests, shouldn't we also?"'
The leftist government of Grenada ranked as a major problem in
the Administration's order of priorities.
The U.S. Atlantic Command staged military exercises which
called for the seizure of Grenada. The first exercise was Ocean
180. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at A20, col. 3.
181. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1983, at A12, col. 1.
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Venture 1981, conducted off Puerto Rico."'2 The island state as-
saulted was code-named "Amber and the Amberines." The full
name of Grenada is Grenada and the Grenadines. An area on Gre-
nada near Point Salines is called Amber. The exercise was con-
ducted by the Army Rangers, which participated in the actual in-
vasion. The objective of Ocean Venture 1981 was to capture
"Amber," install a "government friendly to America," and keep
troops there until elections. In the exercise, "Amber" was sup-
ported by "Orange" (an apparent reference to Cuba), which in turn
was supported by "Red" (an apparent reference to the U.S.S.R.).
At a press conference the Ocean Venture 1981 commander stated
"Amber" was "exporting terrorist activities to neighboring is-
lands." He said the exercise scenario called for the rescue of
"twenty U.S. citizens held hostage there after negotiations with the
Amber Government had broken down." The exercise was con-
ducted to demonstrate "U.S. capabilities to respond in the Carib-
bean Basin."' 3 Further in 1981 the C.I.A. planned a covert opera-
tion to overthrow the Government of Grenada but dropped the
plan reportedly because the Senate Intelligence Committee ob-
jected.8" In 1981 the Administration told Bishop that his ties to
Cuba threatened the peace of the region, and in 1982 Reagan com-
plained to Adams and Seaga of the "spread of the virus" of com-
munism from Grenada.1 8 5
In early 1983, the Grenada Government accused the United
States of planning to invade Grenada. lee In late September 1983,
the 2d Battalion of the 75th Rangers Division practiced capture of
an airport and hostage-rescue at Ephrata Municipal Airport in
182. Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1983, at A24, col. 3. For an article suggesting that Ocean
Venture 1981 indicated the Administration's inclinations with respect to Grenada, see
London Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 5, col. 1. Lowenthal said that the invasion of Grenada was
"foreshadowed" by the 1981 mock invasion. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22,
at 140 (statement of Abraham Lowenthal, Visiting Research Fellow, United States-Mexican
Studies, University of Southern California.).
183. C. SEALs, GRENADA: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST DESTABILIZATION 37-38 (1983).
184. Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1983, at A24, col. 3.
185. TIME, Nov. 7, 1983, at 26. For a detailed account of the Reagan administration
political and economic policies to isolate Grenada, see E. NrrosuRG, A. Frmsov & P.
IAKOVLEV, TRAGEIMA GRENADY [The Tragedy of Grenada] 92-105 (1984). House Speaker
Thomas O'Neill stated that Secretary of State Alexander Haig, two weeks after taking office,
said in a private conversation with O'Neill that he considered it desirable to send troops to
Grenada to overthrow its government. Televised statement of Rep. Thomas O'Neill, CBS
television network, Mar. 5, 1986. Confirmed by author with press officer in office of Speaker
O'Neill, telephone conversation, Mar. 6, 1986.
186. Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1983, at 1, col. 3. Id., Apr. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
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Washington State. 8 7 That battalion was one of two that para-
chuted into the Point Salines airport on October 25, 1983.
The Marine Corps unit that landed in Grenada on October 25
had undertaken, prior to its departure for Lebanon, a tactical exer-
cise involving possible diversion from Lebanon to the Caribbean
for seizure of an island. According to the Marine Corps after-study
of the Grenada operation, the
exercise that concluded the pre-deployment training cycle for
BLT 2/8 [Battalion Landing Team 2/8 of the Second Marine
Division, the team that made the Grenada landing] was devel-
oped around a scenario that required the MAU/PHIBRON
[Marine Amphibious Unit/Amphibious Squadron] to divert
from its transit to Lebanon in order to seize the island of "An-
dros" in the Caribbean Sea. Although it was not precisely the
same mission that actually diverted the MAU/PHIBRON to
Grenada, there were some similarities.188
Like Ocean Venture 1981 the "Andros" exercise was doubtless
based on Grenada. Training for a Grenada invasion prior to leaving
for Lebanon indicates that the Administration considered immi-
nent invasion of Grenada a serious possibility.
U.S. motivation cannot be viewed in isolation from its policy
in the region in preceding decades and its policy towards Grenada
since the 1979 coup that brought the New Jewel Movement to
power. The United States has taken a strong stand against leftist
regimes in the Caribbean and has endeavored to bring such re-
gimes down by force as evidenced by Cuba in 1961 and the Domin-
ican Republic in 1965. The United States had the desire to over-
throw a leftist government in Grenada and had shown itself, in
other contexts, willing to use force for that purpose. The ouster of
Prime Minister Bishop by a faction of the New Jewel Movement
enjoying less popular support than Bishop presented an ideal op-
portunity to achieve this goal because neither the population nor
Cuba would support the government."' 9
187. LATIN AMERICA BUREAU, supra note 78, at 79.
188. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW, supra note 96, at 1-2. No date for the exercise is indi-
cated. BLT 2/8 departed for Lebanon on October 18.
189. Pastor stated: "Even Fidel Castro issued a strong condemnation of the regime, and
Michael Manley pledged publicly to seek the expulsion of the New Jewel Party from the
Socialist International. The Grenadian regime was totally isolated." Hearing: U.S. Military
Actions, supra note 22, at 86.
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D. The State Department Contradicted the OECS Analysis
of the Legal Basis for OECS Action
The OECS, as indicated above, cited Article 8 of the OECS
treaty as authority for its October 21 decision to intervene in Gre-
nada.190 Commentators focused on that article in their discussion
of the legality of the OECS action.' 9 ' The Legal Adviser, appar-
ently concerned about the weakness of the OECS' reliance on Arti-
cle 8, claimed that the OECS acted under two other articles of the
OECS treaty. Presumably the OECS knew why it was acting. If it
says it acted under article 8, as it does, then it probably was acting
under article 8 and not some other article of the OECS treaty. 192
Yet the State Department cited Articles 3 and 4 as providing
the basis for the October 21 OECS decision. Reference to these two
Articles was made by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam,
who said, "[The OECS treaty] contains a number of provisions-in
Articles 3, 4, and 8-which deal with local as well as external
threats to peace and security."'9 " In fact, none of the articles refer
to "local" threats to the peace. Article 8 refers to external threats
to the peace, and Articles 3 and 4 refer to neither.
Article 4 is titled "General Undertaking as to Implementa-
tion." It reads, in full:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure the carrying out of obligations
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from decisions taken by
the institutions of the Organisation; in particular, each Member
State shall take all steps to secure the enactment of such legisla-
tion as is necessary to give effect to this Treaty and decisions
taken thereunder." 4
Article 4 simply requires member states to carry out decisions of
190. Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 5, says that the OECS acted
under Article 8. Its request to Jamaica was made under Article 8. Statement of Jamaica
(Richardson) 38 U.N. SCOR (2489th mtg.) at 27, U.N. DOC S/P.V. 2489 (1983). Prime Min-
ister Charles of Dominica, chair of the OECS, said the OECS decision of October 21 was
under Article 8. Id. at 7.
191. The text of the OECS treaty is cited supra note 146.
192. One flaw in the analysis in the text is that, as indicated supra note 174, the OECS
request was drafted by the State Department not by the OECS. This makes it difficult to
determine the true basis on which the OECS purported to act.
193. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 81.
194. Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, June 18, 1981,
art. 4, 20 I.L.M. 1166 (1981).
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the OECS. It does not give the OECS any power to take any ac-
tion. The Legal Adviser does not refer to article 4 in his argument
justifying the OECS action. The Legal Adviser asserts that the
OECS acted under Articles 3 and 6. Contradicting both the OECS
and Deputy Secretary Dam, the Legal Adviser writes that Article 8
is irrelevant:
[M]uch of the analysis to date has focused exclusively on the
language of Article 8 of the OECS Treaty. Article 8, however,
defines the jurisdiction of the Defense and Security Committee
of the OECS, a subordinate body under that treaty. The deci-
sion to take military action on Grenada was reached by the
heads of government of the OECS nationals, who-unlike the
Defense and Security Committee-have plenary authority under
Article 6 of that Treaty. Article 3(2) of the OECS Treaty ex-
pressly empowers the heads of government to pursue joint poli-
cies in the field of mutual defense and security, and "such other
activities calculated to further the purposes of the Organization
as the member States may from time to time decide."
It is clear from statements of the OECS Secretariat that all
OECS members present at the October 21 meeting of heads of
government voted in favor of collective action. The provisions of
Article 6 of the OECS Treaty provide that actions may be taken
without the presence of a Member State if the absent state later
ratifies the decision or abstains from voting. Given the authority
of the Governor-General [of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon] discussed
above, his request for collective action manifestly constituted
ratification on the part of Grenada. Perhaps the most important
aspect of the debate over the OECS Treaty is that all members
of the OECS regard the action taken as consistent with the
treaty. We submit that the views of the members of a regional
treaty on questions of treaty interpretation are entitled to a
weight greater than those of third-state commentators.'"5
Thus, while Deputy Secretary Dam finds justification for the
OECS action in Articles 3, 4, and 8, the Legal Adviser rests the
legality of the action on Articles 3 (mentioned by Dam) and 6 (not
mentioned by Dam).
The Department's difficulty in agreeing on an argument stems
from the fact that none of these articles provides justification for
the OECS action. The Legal Adviser's quoted argument is un-
sound. His first assertion is that the October 21 decision was taken
195. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 383-84.
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pursuant to Article 6' as rather than pursuant to Article 8. Article 8,
as he correctly indicates, defines the competence of the Defense
and Security Committee." '
196. Article 6 reads as follows:
ARTICLE 6. Composition and Functions of the Authority
1. The Authority shall be composed of Heads of Government of the Mem-
ber States.
2. Any member of the Authority may, as appropriate, designate a Minister
to represent such member at any meeting of the Authority.
3. Only Member States possessing the necessary competence in respect of
matters under consideration from time to time shall take part in the delibera-
tions of the Authority.
4. The Authority shall be the supreme policy-making institution of the Or-
ganisation. It shall be responsible for, and have the general direction and control
of the performance of the functions of the Organisation, for the progressive de-
velopment of the Organisation and the achievement of its purposes.
5. The Authority shall have power to make decisions on all matters within
its competence. All such decisions shall require the affirmative vote of all Mem-
ber States present and voting at the meeting of the Authority at which such
decisions were taken provided that such decisions shall have no force and effect
until ratified by those Member States, if any, which were not present at that
meeting, or until such Member States have notified the Authority of their deci-
sion to abstain. Such decisions by the Authority shall be binding on all Member
States and on all institutions of the Organisation and effect shall be given to any
such decisions provided that it is within the sovereign competence of Member
States to implement them.
6. The Authority may make such recommendations and give such directives
as it deems necessary for the achievement of the purposes of the Organisation
and for ensuring the smooth functioning of the institutions of the Organisation.
7. The Authority may establish, and designate as such, institutions of the
Organisation in addition to those specified in sub-paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e)
of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of this Treaty, as it deems necessary for the achieve-
ment of the purposes of the Organisation.
8. Subject to the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Authority shall be
the final authority for the conclusion of treaties or other international agree-
ments on behalf of the Organisation and for entering into relationships between
the Organisation and other International Organisations and third countries.
9. Subject to the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the Authority shall take
decisions for the purpose of establishing the financial arrangements necessary
for meeting the expenses of the Organisation and shall be the final authority on
questions arising in relation to the financial affairs of the Organisation.
10. The Authority shall meet at least twice a year. It shall determine its own
procedure including that for convening meetings, for the conduct of business
thereat and at other times, and for the annual rotation of the office of Chairman
among its members in accordance with the principle of alphabetical order of the
Member States.
11. The Authority shall in addition meet in extraordinary session whenever
it deems necessary in accordance with the regulations laid down in its rules of
procedure.
197. Article 8 reads, in full:
ARTICLE 8. Composition and Functions of the Defence and Security
Committee
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The Legal Adviser asserts that the October 21 decision was
taken not by the Defense and Security Committee (composed of
ministers of member states responsible for defense) but by the Au-
thority (composed of heads of government of member states)."",
In the Security Council debate, OECS member St. Lucia
claimed that the October 21 meeting was held under Article 8 and
that it was a meeting of the Defense and Security committee, not
of the Authority:
The Defence and Security Committee of the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States decided to seek assistance to combat a
threat to the security of its members and to respond to a request
by a legal authority in Grenada, a member of the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States, to remove a threat from within.' 9s
The Barbados representative also told the Security Council that
1. The Defence and Security Committee shall consist of the Ministers re-
sponsible for Defence and Security or other Ministers or plenipotentiaries desig-
nated by Heads of Government of the Member States.
2. Only Member States possessing the necessary competence in respect of
matters under consideration from time to time shall take part in the delibera-
tions of the Defence and Security Committee.
3. The Defence and Security Committee shall be responsible to the Author-
ity. It shall take appropriate action on any matters referred to it by the Author-
ity and shall have the power to make recommendations to the Authority. It shall
advise the Authority on matters relating to external defence and on arrange-
ments for collective security against external aggression, including mercenary ag-
gression, with or without the support of internal or national elements.
4. The Defence and Security Committee shall have responsibility for coordi-
nating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the preservation
of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of
close ties among the Member States of the Organisation in matters of external
defence and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries,
operating with or without the support of internal or national elements, in the
exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognised
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
5. The decisions and directives of the Defence and Security Committee
shall be unanimous and shall be binding on all subordinate institutions of the
Organisation unless otherwise determined by the Authority.
6. Subject to any directives that the Authority may give, the Defence and
Security Committee shall meet as and when necessary. It shall determine its own
procedure, including that for convening meetings, for the conduct of business
thereat and at other times, and for the annual rotation of the Office of Chairman
among its members in accordance with the principle of alphabetical order of the
Member States.
198. Reagan, too, said it was the Authority that acted, not the Defense and Security
Committee. Letter to the Congress, Oct. 25, 1983, printed in Collectiue Action, supra note
7, at 68. So does Moore. Moore, supra note 13, at 164.
199. 38 U.N. SCOR (2491st mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2491 (1983).
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the Defense and Security Committee of the OECS made the Octo-
ber 21 decision.
2 0 0
However, the Legal Adviser's view that the Authority made
the October 21 decision is supported by the October 23 written re-
quest sent by the OECS to the United States and to Jamaica. That
communication states:
Under the authority of Article 8 of the treaty establishing the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the authority pro-
poses therefore to take action for collective defense and preser-
vation of peace and security against external aggression by re-
questing assistance from friendly countries to provide transport,
logistics, support and additional military personnel to assist the
efforts of the O.E.C.S. to stabilize this most grave situation
within the Eastern Caribbean.20'
Barbados Prime Minister Adams provides support for the position
that the Authority made the October 21 decision. He stated that
the OECS held two separate meetings that evening: a meeting of
the Defense and Security Committee, and a meeting of the Author-
ity, but he neglects to clarify at which meeting the decision was
made:
That evening the OECS, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St.
Kitts Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, with
Montserrat held a meeting-first a formal meeting of their Min-
isters of Defense and then a meeting of their governing Author-
ity, and unanimously agreed to invoke article 8 of their treaty of
association and to seek the assistance of friendly countries to
stabilise the situation and to establish a peacekeeping force.2"
The discrepancy between the St. Lucia statement and the
OECS October 23 request is probably due to the manner in which
the October 23 request was drafted. As indicated above, that re-
quest was drafted by the State Department and taken to Barbados
by a State Department emissary for approval 03 and was issued
200. Id. at 72-73 (statement of Mr. Moseley, Barbados). The October 21 meeting was
held in Barbados.
201. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A19, col. 5 (request to U.S.); W. GILMORe, supra note
11, at 98-101 (request to Jamaica, identical to that to the United States, as given by Prime
Minister Edward Seaga on Oct. 25, 1983, speech to Jamaica House of Representatives, as
reported in The Daily Gleaner (Kingston) Oct. 26, 1983, with cover letter signed by Eugenia
Charles as Chairman of OECS).
202. Adams Transcript, supra note 164, at 3, also in W. GnrMona, supra note 11, at 103-
04.
203. Supra notes 174-75.
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over the signature of Charles alone. Thus, it is unclear whether the
other member states were involved in its approval or whether the
issue arose at the October 21 meeting. No documentary evidence
exists on this point. The idea that the meeting should be consid-
ered to be a meeting of the Authority probably originated in the
State Department, and most likely in the Legal Adviser's office.
Even if the October 21 meeting was held under Article 6, that
would not justify the OECS decision to intervene in Grenada. The
Legal Adviser relies on Article 6 to avoid two strictures of Article
8: (1) its requirement that a decision must receive the affirmative
votes of all member states; and (2) its requirement that OECS mil-
itary action may be taken only to stop "external aggression. '20 4 On
the first point, the Legal Adviser acknowledges that under Article
8 a vote is valid only if all member states vote affirmatively while
he distinguishes the procedure of Article 6, which requires an af-
firmative vote only of those states present and voting, provided
that the remaining states subsequently either ratify the vote or ab-
stain. The Legal Adviser claims that the alleged request from
Scoon constitutes a ratification. 05 As indicated below, it is doubt-
ful that Scoon issued such a request prior to the invasion. Further,
even if he did, he was unauthorized to do so, because of his consti-
tutional position and because the RMC was the functioning Gov-
ernment of Grenada.2 0 6
On the second point, the Legal Adviser claims that the Au-
thority has power to order OECS military action under Article 3,
an article that lists the purposes and functions of the OECS. Arti-
cle 3 contains no limitation on military action to "external aggres-
sion." The Legal Adviser thus concludes that the Authority may,
under Article 3, take military action in absence of "external aggres-
sion." This conclusion is baseless, however, because Article 3 does
not authorize the Authority to take military action. In fact, Article
3 does not mention the Authority. It merely lists purposes and
204. Unlike the Legal Adviser, Dam argued that the unanimity requirement of Article 8
had been met, and that there was a danger of external aggression (he stretches Article 8 to
include danger of external aggression) in view of the Cuban military presence in Grenada
and the "vacuum of authority" there. Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at
34.
205. Dam, who claimed that the OECS relied on Article 8, stated that the alleged Scoon
request constituted unanimity for purposes of that article, and, in addition, that the "vac-
uum of authority" in Grenada permitted the OECS to act without a vote from Grenada.
Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 30-31.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 212-47, 317-33.
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functions but does not grant power to take specific action. 20 7
The Legal Adviser claims that Article 3, paragraph 2, grants
207. Article 3 reads in full:
ARTICLE 3. Purposes and Functions of the Organisation.
1. The major purposes of the Organisation shall be:
(a) to promote co-operation among the Member States at the regional
and international levels having due regard to the Treaty establishing the
Caribbean Community and the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) to promote unity and solidarity among the Member States and to
defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;
(c) to assist the Member States in the realisation of their obligations
and responsibilities to the international community with due regard to
the role of international law as a standard of conduct in their relationship;
(d) to seek to achieve the fullest possible harmonisation of foreign
policy among the Member States; to seek to adopt, as far as possible,
common positions on international issues and to establish and maintain
wherever possible, arrangements for joint overseas representation and/or
common services;
(e) to promote economic integration among the Member States
through the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the East Caribbean
Common Market; and
(f) to pursue the said purposes through its respective institutions by
discussion of questions of common concern and by agreement and com-
mon action.
2. To this end the Member States will endeavor to co-ordinate, harmonise
and pursue joint policies particularly in the field of-
(a) External Relations including Overseas representation;
(b) International Trade Agreements and other External Economic
Relations;
(c) Financial and Technical Assistance from external sources;
(d) International Marketing of Goods and Services including
Tourism;
(e) External Transportation and Communications including Civil
Aviation;
(f) Economic Integration among the Member States through the pro-
visions of the Agreement Establishing the East Caribbean Common
Market;
(g) Matters relating to the sea and its resources;
(h) The Judiciary;
(i) Currency and Central Banking;
(j) Audit;
(k) Statistics;
(1) Income Tax Administration;
(m) Customs and Excise Administration;
(n) Tertiary Education including University;
(o) Training in Public Administration and Management;
I Scientific, Technical and Cultural Co-operation;
(q) Mutual Defence and Security; and
(r) Such other activities calculated to further the purposes of the Or-
ganisation as the Member States may from time to time decide.
Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, June 18, 1981, art. 3, 20
I.L.M. 1166 (1981).
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the Authority the power to order OECS military action, relying on
the fact that the Authority is identified in Article 6 as the "su-
preme policy-making institution of the Organisation." However,
Article 3 never mentions the Authority. Article 6's language does
not, however, empower the Authority to make particular kinds of
decisions. The power to take military action is given to the Defense
and Security Committee, not to the Authority.
A crucial obstacle to the Legal Adviser's interpretation is that
Article 3 is merely a listing of purposes and functions. It does not
provide any institution of the OECS with the power to undertake
decisions in any field. Like Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations
Charter, characterizing the fields in which the organization will
function but leaving to subsequent provisions the specific powers
to be exercised by the organization, Article 3 merely identifies the
areas in which the OECS may act; it does not state what action
may be taken in those areas.
The Legal Adviser relies on two items listed in Article 3, para-
graph 2: item "q" (mutual defence and security), and item "r
(such other activities calculated to further the purposes of the Or-
ganization as the Member States may from time to time decide).
He concludes that this bare enumeration of functions gives the Au-
thority the power to order military action in a member state. This
argument is unfounded because Article 3 does not specify what the
Authority (or any other organ of the OECS) may do with respect
to those fields of activity. It is a mere enumeration of fields of ac-
tivity. A treaty which grants an international organization the
power to take military action spells out the situations in which mil-
itary action may be taken. For example, the United Nations Char-
ter does so in chapter 7. Likewise the OECS treaty does so in Arti-
cle 8. The Legal Adviser attempted to avoid the "external
aggression" requirement of Article 8, but Article 3 does not indi-
cate the instances in which military action may be taken by the
OECS. One may not derive a power to take military action from a
provision that does not indicate under what circumstances military
action may be taken.
Similarly, the Legal Adviser's reliance on paragraph "r" is
groundless since that paragraph merely gives the organization
power to involve itself in additional fields of activity determined
from time to time by member states. It does not give the organiza-
tion power to send troops into a member state.
The Legal Adviser's interpretation cuts against the principle
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of construction that a specific provision takes precedence over a
general provision. Only Article 8 of the OECS treaty specifies when
military action may be undertaken. Therefore, the drafters clearly
intended that OECS military action was governed by Article 8. Ar-
ticle 8 limits OECS military action to situations of external aggres-
sion. The member states drafting the treaty clearly did not grant
the OECS power to take military action in any situation not in-
volving external aggression. If the Legal Adviser's interpretation
were correct, that limitation would have no meaning.
Attempting to justify the OECS action, the Legal Adviser ad-
vanced an absurd interpretation of the OECS treaty, an interpreta-
tion not made by any OECS member state and one which is con-
tradicted'by the OECS, which, as indicated, stated that it took its
October 21 decision under Article 8. Significantly, in advancing his
Article 3 analysis, the Legal Adviser acknowledges that Article 8
does not provide a legal basis for the October 21 decision. Thus, he
undercuts the view of the OECS itself that Article 8 provides a
lawful basis for the decision. Additionally, he undercuts the views
of Secretary of State Shultz, Deputy Secretary Dam, and OAS Am-
bassador Middendorf, all of whom rely on Article 8 as the basis for
the OECS decision, and hence for U.S. action in Grenada.
The Legal Adviser also repudiated two additional arguments
that the OECS used to justify its action: anticipatory self-defense
and humanitarian intervention. The Legal Adviser wrote:
I would like to turn briefly to a discussion of the arguments
which have been put forward by some commentators, but which
the United States did not make in support of its actions on Gre-
nada. We did not contend that the action on Grenada was an
exercise of the inherent right of self-defense recognized in Arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter for the same reason that
the United States eschewed such arguments in support of the
actions taken by the United States and other Rio Treaty mem-
bers in response to the Cuban missile crisis .... We did not
assert a broad doctrine of "humanitarian intervention." We re-
lied instead on the narrower, well-established ground of protec-
tion of United States nationals. 08
208. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 385-86. Schachter is in accord with the Legal Ad-
viser that the 0ECS action cannot be justified as self-defense. Schachter, supra note 10, at
1640-41. Contradicting the Legal Adviser, Deputy Secretary of State Dam upheld the Carib-
bean states' claim of self-defense as a justification for the invasion of Grenada. Hearing:
U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 26, 38. For an argument that the OECS action was
justified as a response to aggression by Cuba, see Fraser, Grenada-the Sovereignty of a
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The Legal Adviser claimed that the U.S. action was legally
grounded on the OECS action. The OECS in turn based its action
on anticipatory self-defense and humanitarian intervention. The
OECS statement explaining its October 21 decision gave three jus-
tifications: internal disorder in Grenada, violation of human rights
of Grenadians by the RMC, and self-defense against a threat posed
by the military buildup in Grenada.
The Legal Adviser asserts that the United States does not rely
on those arguments. However, the United States does rely on the
OECS action, and the OECS action is based on those arguments.
The United States cannot rely on the OECS action without relying
on the OECS' grounds for acting. Logically the only other basis for
U.S. reliance on the OECS action would be if the United States
found some legal justification for the OECS action other than
those given by the OECS. However, no other justifications have
been provided.
Thus, the Legal Adviser, apparently realizing the weakness of
the OECS arguments and desiring to distance the State Depart-
ment from them, has undercut not only the OECS position but
also the Department's own position, because the Department's po-
sition is based on the OECS action.
VI. THIRD JUSTIFICATION: REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF
GRENADA
Because United States action cannot be justified solely on the
rescue-of-nationals rationale, having extended beyond that aim,
and because the OECS request argument is weak, the State De-
partment relied primarily on an alleged request by the Govern-
ment of Grenada. This argument is listed first by the Department's
two primary expositors of its legal position on Grenada, Deputy
Secretary Dam and Legal Adviser Robinson, in their enumeration
of the three justifications they assert. 09 The Department argued
that the Governor-General has certain executive powers under the
Grenada constitution; that while the cabinet would ordinarily be
the government, there was no functioning cabinet or other govern-
mental authority, and that therefore the Governor-General re-
People, New Jewels are Sometimes Rough Diamonds!, 7 W. INDIAN L.J. 205, 233-61 (1983).
209. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 80 (statement of Deputy Secretary Dam); Legal
Adviser, supra note 1, at 382. Neither Dam nor the Legal Adviser claims that this argument
is primary, but the order of listing is indicative.
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mained the only constitutional authority. Dam stated that the
Governor-General "has executive power" and that at the time he
was the "sole remaining authoritative representative of the Gov-
ernment on Grenada." 210
Scholars have focused primarily on whether Sir Paul Scoon,
Governor-General of Grenada and the author of the alleged re-
quest, had the constitutional authority to issue such a request.
Opinions are divided on this issue. 21 ' The discussion that follows
does not treat the issue of Scoon's powers under the Grenada Con-
stitution. The author agrees with those analysts, particularly Gil-
more, who conclude that the Governor-General's position is not
one of executive authority, and that the Governor-General may
only act with the consent of the Government of Grenada, which in
this instance was the RMC. The discussion focuses rather on three
issues that have received less attention. First, the Department has
not proved Scoon issued a request for outside military intervention
prior to the invasion. Second, if Scoon did issue such a request at
the time claimed by the Department, the U.S. decision to invade
Grenada preceded that request. This undermines the Department's
position that the intervention was a response to a request from
Scoon. Third, if Scoon issued such a request, that request was le-
gally invalid because regardless of Scoon's status under the Gre-
nada constitution, there was no vacuum of authority in Grenada at
the time, so that Scoon was not the holder of residual authority as
argued by the Department.
A. The State Department Has Not Proven That a Request
Was Made
Little evidence exists that Scoon made a request for outside
military intervention prior to the invasion.21 2 The Economist con-
210. Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 5, 30. Although disputed
today, it has traditionally been recognized that a government may request outside military
intervention to suppress rebels. Whether that justification applies to Grenada is considered
infra text accompanying notes 317-33.
211. Questioning Scoon's authority are Schachter, supra note 10, at 1644-45; Joyner,
supra note 148, at 139; Nanda, supra note 11, at 414; W. GILMORz, supro note 11, at 64-73.
Upholding it are Moore, supra note 13, at 159-61; Vagts, International Law Under Time
Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-Home Examination, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 171; Dieguez,
The Grenada Intervention: "Illegal" in Form, Sound as Policy, 16 N.Y.U.J. OF INT'L L. &
POL. 1167, 1191 (1984).
212. One author, finding no evidence to substantiate or reject the claim, writes: "The
matter will probably not be resolved conclusively until the United States diplomatic files are
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cluded that, "the Scoon request was almost certainly a fabrication
concocted between the OECS and Washington to calm the post-
invasion diplomatic storm. As concoctions go, it was flimsy."""3 Er-
rol Barrow, former prime minister of Barbados, referred to the al-
leged request from Scoon as a "belated excuse," a "story that not
even the most uncritical follower of the events is tempted to enter-
tain. '2 1' Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark calls the refer-
ence to an invitation a "false claim. '215 Available information sup-
ports the view of Clark, Barrow, and the Economist.
The State Department's statements of October 25 and 26 re-
garding Grenada did not mention a request from Scoon.216 The
first mention by Department officials came on October 27,2"' one
day after Prime Minister Charles made the first mention of such a
request, as she spoke to the United Nations Security Council.218
The Department explained that it had not mentioned the alleged
request earlier because it feared for the safety of Scoon, who was
taken from his residence to an offshore U.S. ship on the morning of
October 26.219 Deputy Secretary Dam stated, "We were unable to
make this request public until the Governor General's safety had
been assured .. .,,2o The Legal Adviser, similarly, stated, "We
were unable to cite his request in our first statement of the United
States position because of fears for his safety. At the time, his
home was still surrounded by heavily armed forces."1
2 2
'
The Legal Adviser's statement that Scoon's house was sur-
rounded by "heavily armed forces" is correct but misleading. He
made it appear that Scoon's home was attacked. Scoon's home was
opened thirty years hence." Levitin, supra note 11, at 646.
213. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1984, at 31, 34. Schachter, citing this passage, expresses
doubt as to whether Scoon issued a request. Schachter, supra note 10, at 1644 n.66. Fred
Halliday of the London School of Economics, similarly concluded that the request was "con-
cocted by the pliant Scoon and his American prompters after the event." Halliday, supra
note 159, at 21. See also Halliday, Controlling the Caribbean, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 4,
1983, at 8.
214. Barrow, supra note 83, at 4. Barrow was prime minister from 1966 to 1976. An
attorney, he leads the parliamentary opposition in Barbados.
215. Clark, supra note 129, at 605.
216. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 67 (Reagan), 69 (Shultz), 72 (Middendorf).
217. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 76 (Kirkpatrick). See also Hearing: The Situa-
tion in Grenada, supra note 15, at 5 (statement of Deputy Secretary Dam).
218. See U.N. CHRONICLE, Dec. 1983, at 18; N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A19, col. 1.
219. On Scoon's departure with U.S. forces, see Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1983, at 21, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A19, col. 5.
220. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 80.
221. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 382.
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surrounded by the PRA because a U.S. commando unit landed late
Monday night, October 24 or early on the morning of October 25,
and had entered Scoon's home. Then, PRA forces surrounded
Scoon's house and engaged the U.S. force. A stand-off continued
until the morning of Wednesday, October 26.222 Thus, the fact that
Scoon's home was surrounded does not mean that Grenada forces
were threatening his life.
The Department's claim that it delayed announcing Scoon's
request for his safety is undermined by the fact that Prime Minis-
ter Charles, in announcing the invasion at the White House on the
morning of October 25, said:
It is the intention of the member governments of the OECS that
once the threat has been removed, they will invite the Governor
General of Grenada to assume executive authority of the coun-
try under the provisions of the Grenada Constitution of 1973
and to appoint a broad-based interim government to administer
the country pending the holding of general elections.'"
If it was too dangerous to announce Scoon's alleged request it
would have likewise been too dangerous to announce that he was
invited to head an interim government. If genuine concern over
Scoon's safety existed, the prudent course was to omit mention of
any possible connection between him and the invading states. As
Charles spoke, flanked by President Reagan and Secretary of State
Shultz, the Grenada army surrounded Scoon's home. A more likely
reason for the failure to mention a Scoon request until October 26
is that, as will presently be explained, such a request was not ob-
tained until Scoon's departure from Grenada on October 26.
Most commentators do not question the assertion that Scoon
issued a request. Boyle and the ABA report expressed doubt.2 '
The principals vary considerably in their accounts as to the time
and manner of Scoon's alleged request. When Prime Minister
Charles first claimed there had been a request, she said Scoon
222. For an account of this episode, see R. GABRIEL, supra note 101, at 160-61. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that Grenadian forces "appeared to be moving to surround
the governor's house" after the Seals team was inside, suggesting that those forces had not
surrounded the house previously. JCS Replies, supra note 97, at 31.
223. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 68.
224. Those accepting the validity of the request are Joyner, supra note 149, at 139;
Moore, supra note 13, at 159; Vagts, supra note 211, at 171; Nanda, supra note 11, at 412;
W. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 64-74; Wheeler, supra note 13, at 428. Those expressing
skepticism are F. BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 273 (1985); Committee on
Grenada, supra note 12, at 345-47.
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made it prior to the OECS meeting of October 21.228 The St. Lucia
representative at the United Nations said the October 21 OECS
decision was in response to a request from Scoon.2 2 6 Scoon contra-
dicted this version of the timing of the alleged request when he
first spoke on the subject on October 31. On BBC-TV, Scoon said
that he first decided on the need for outside assistance on the eve-
ning of October 23.227 Scoon told the Guardian that on October 24
he sent Barbados Prime Minister Adams a letter inviting OECS
intervention.228 Thus, Scoon denied making the request at the time
indicated by Charles. State Department officials have specified two
other dates. Deputy Secretary Dam stated, "[W]e were informed,
on October 24, by Prime Minister Adams of Barbados that Gre-
nada's Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, had used a confidential
channel to transmit an appeal to the OECS and other regional
states to restore order on the island, ' '22 9 which is consistent with
Scoon's statement. However, the Legal Adviser claimed "[W]e
were first advised of it on October 23."'23o
Scoon's claim that he sent a written request to Adams was
contradicted by Adams. On October 26, Adams claimed oral com-
munication between Scoon and other Caribbean leaders occurred
prior to the invasion but makes no mention of a written request
from Scoon on October 24. Regarding a written communication
from Scoon Adams stated: "He [Scoon] has now given his sanction
and Brigadier [Rudy] Lewis, head of the Caribbean forces in Gre-
nada is in possession of his signed letter of invitation to the OECS
and other participating governments."23s Adams thus implied that
Scoon's signed letter appeared only after the invasion. "Common-
wealth diplomatic sources" similarly reported that the letter was
signed only after incoming troops fought their way to Scoon's
225. Statement of Prime Minister Charles, supra note 218, at 18, reported in The
London Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at 5, col. 1; Guardian, Oct. 27, 1983, at 6, col. 1; A. PAYNE,
supra note 21, at 151. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at A19, col. 1. Charles repeated the claim
to the OAS, again saying Scoon made the request before the October 21 OECS meeting.
Acta de la sesibn extraordinaria, supra note 42, at 26.
226. The representative of St. Lucia, Mr. St. Aimee, said in the Security Council on
October 27 that the OECS acted on October 21 "to respond to a request by a legal authority
in Grenada." 38 U.N. SCOR (2491st mtg.) at 18, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2491 (1983).
227. Panorama, BBC-TV transcript, (Oct. 31, 1983), quoted in Committee on Grenada,
supra note 12, at 346.
228. Guardian, Nov. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6
229. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 80.
230. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 382.




Scoon's issuing a written request after the invasion would not
be fatal if it were a confirmation of an earlier oral request. How-
ever, Scoon did not claim that he made an oral request prior to the
invasion; rather he claimed that the letter he sent to Adams on
October 24 was his only communication prior to the invasion, a
claim which Adams contradicted. Evidently, the letter signed by
Scoon as incoming troops reached him (October 25 or 26) was the
first manifestation of Scoon's desire for intervention.
Although Scoon mentioned no pre-invasion oral request, Ad-
ams claimed some communication between Scoon and Caribbean
leaders .22  Adams claimed that following the OECS decision to in-
tervene, Scoon's "opinion and approval were obtained, and ar-
rangements were made for him to issue a formal invitation to in-
tervene when politically safe for him to do so.''2s4 Thus any
possible pre-invasion oral request by Scoon would have been a re-
sponse to a solicitation from the OECS that he issue such a re-
quest. A request in response to a solicitation by the intervenors
casts doubt on its validity.
The letter was apparently composed outside Grenada, carried
to Grenada for Scoon's signature on October 24, and signed by him
that same day.288 According to Scoon, the letter was delivered to
him by a diplomat from a non-participating country whose identity
he declined to divulge.2 3
6
Adams indirectly confirmed that Scoon did not compose the
letter. Adams' reference (quoted above) to the Scoon letter is cau-
tious with respect to who may have composed it. To repeat, Adams
said that "Brigadier Lewis is in possession of his [Scoon's] signed
letter. 2 s17 Adams did not say that Scoon wrote a letter and gave it
to Lewis. This is consistent with Adams' statement that "arrange-
ments were made for him [Scoon] to issue a formal invitation to
232. Guardian, Oct. 28, 1983, at 6, col. 2.
233. Adams Transcript, supra note 165, at 5.
234. London Times, Dec. 10, 1983, at 4, col. 8. The statement was made in a speech
Adams gave to the Royal Commonwealth Society, London, excerpted in W. GILMORE, supra
note I, at 109.
235. Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 2, 1983, at 2, col. 4. Scoon's statement to Canadian
Press writer Larry Black was confirmed to the author by Black in a telephone conversation
of July 3, 1985. Scoon made the statement during an interview with Black in Grenada Nov.
1, 1983.
236. Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 2, 1983, at 2, col. 4.
237. See supra text accompanying note 231.
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intervene when politically safe for him to do so."2' 8
An Adams aide confirmed Scoon's account that a letter was
brought to him for signature. According to Debora Hughes, Adams'
press officer, letters were taken into Grenada by the invading
forces for Scoon's signature, including a letter dated October 24
addressed to each of the participating states and two copies. Lewis
carried one batch of letters and a "courier" in the U.S. forces car-
ried the other. Whichever group reached Scoon first would get him
to sign the letters.23 9
The letter's wording clearly indicated that Scoon did not com-
pose it. Addressed to Adams, the letter recites: "I am also seeking
assistance from the United States, from Jamaica, and from the Or-
ganisation of Eastern Caribbean States." 40 Only states that partic-
ipated in the event are named; while other states in the region that
may have been potential intervenors were absent from the list. The
naming of the actual intervenors suggests that whoever composed
the letter already knew those states were planning to intervene.
While Scoon did not compose the letter, he may have signed it
on October 24, as he claims.24' Late on the night of October 24, a
U.S. commando force landed in Grenada and went to Scoon's
home. The U.S. commando force spent October 25 in his house,
surrounded by and fighting against PRA forces and left only after
the main invasion force extricated it in the morning of October
26." 2
Only Scoon's letter to Barbados has been made public al-
though the State Department claims to have a letter from Scoon
238. See supra text accompanying note 234.
239. George, Did Washington Ghost-Write Scoon's Appeal?, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 11,
1983, at 5. In a letter to the author on July 15, 1985, George confirmed the Hughes state-
ment, which he said was made during a telephone call he made to Hughes in Barbados from
London. George telephoned again several days later to verify, and Hughes confirmed her
initial account.
240. The full text of the letter was printed in London Times, Nov. 10, 1983, at 6, col. 2.
It also appears in J.N. MooRE, supra note 95, at 87.
241. Supra note 228.
242. OPERATiONAL OVERVIEW, supra note 96, at 16 (stating that the commando team
had been barricaded in Scoon's house "since early on D-Day" and was "rescued" along with
Scoon at 7:10 a.m. Oct. 26, 1983). Confirmed by U.S. Navy spokesperson Commander
Michael Sherman, quoted in Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 7, 1983, at 11, col. 2; Bennett,
supra note 150, at 76; Battle for Grenada, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1983, at 75; D-Day in Gre-
nada, supra note 111, at 25. The commando team has been identified as being either Navy
Seals or the Delta force. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
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addressed to the United States.2 48 Since a request from Scoon is
the Department's principal legal justification for the Grenada ac-
tion, curiously it has not made public the intervention-request let-
ter from Scoon it claims to have.
A final ground for doubting that Scoon issued a request for
intervention is his discussions with Commonwealth country offi-
cials over the weekend before the invasion both by telephone and
in person. None of these communications indicate that he wanted
military intervention. " '
Scoon's failure to put any request in writing until after the
invasion, and his signing a letter handed him by the invading
forces, raises a serious question as to the voluntariness of, and mo-
tive behind, such an alleged request. After U.S. forces fought their
way into his house, Scoon must have clearly realized that the RMC
would lose the battle. Thus, Scoon must have been under pressure
to sign the letter. Even if the U.S. forces did not threaten Scoon
(and there is no evidence that they did) Scoon's failure to sign
would have put him in an uncomfortable situation. By signing,
Scoon promoted the invading forces' view that he was the only
lawful authority in Grenada and that he was the head of whatever
government existed in Grenada. A refusal to sign would have rele-
gated him to a much lesser role.
The contradictory accounts of how the request was made beg
the conclusion that the State Department has failed to prove
Scoon made such a request prior to the invasion, since an interven-
ing state claiming a request from lawful authority must prove that
such a request was made. One is reminded of the U.S.S.R.'s early
claim after its Czechoslovakia intervention in 1968 that it had been
requested to intervene.14 5 When that claim proved difficult to sub-
stantiate,2' 4 the U.S.S.R. substituted the argument that is now
known as the Brezhnev doctrine.2 47 Here the State Department
243. London Times, Nov. 10, 1983, at 6, col. 2. Ivan J. Barnes, Foreign News Editor of
the London Times, stated in a letter to the author dated July 10, 1985: "Repeated enquiries
at the White House and the State Department by our correspondents failed to produce a
text of the letter received by the Reagan administration."
244. LATIN AMERICA BuREAu, supra note 78, at 88.
245. TASS statement, Aug. 21, 1968, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1283 (1968).
246. Declaration of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian
Communist Party, Aug. 21, 1968 (stating that the entry of U.S.S.R. troops had occurred
without the consent of the Czechoslovakian Government), reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1285 (1968).
247. Pravda, Sept. 25, 1968, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968, at A3, col. 1; 7
I.L.M. 1323 (1968).
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clings to its claim that there was a request but offers little evidence
to substantiate this theory.
B. The Decision to Invade Was Made Prior to the Alleged
Request
The Administration's decision to invade Grenada was almost
certainly made before the alleged request from Scoon. Few com-
mentators have addressed whether the alleged Scoon request pre-
ceded the U.S. decision to invade.14' Nanda prefaces his discussion
of Scoon's legal authority by "[assuming . . . that Sir Paul Scoon
did seek outside legal assistance before the U.S. decided to inter-
vene." 49 According to the A.B.A. report, Scoon asked for outside
help on October 23, "several hours after President Reagan decided,
provisionally, to proceed with the military assistance requested by
the OECS." 50 Thus, both Nanda and the A.B.A. committee imply
that the request, to have legal significance, must precede the deci-
sion to intervene. Boyle is emphatic on the point, stating, "Since
Sir Paul's request for assistance came well after Reagan's order to
invade, the former becomes completely immaterial to analyzing the
legality or illegality of the U.S. invasion.
2 5 1
To the contrary, the Legal Adviser claimed that the request
preceded the decision and served as a motive for the decision: "It
[Scoon's request] was clearly an important factor in the decision
reached by the President on October 24 to respond favorably to
the request of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) for United States assistance. 2 52 Boyle's conclusion cor-
rectly times the situation while the Legal Adviser's assumption is
incorrect. The Department disingenuously claimed that the deci-
sion to invade was partially motivated by a request from Scoon.
The Department asserted that the decision to invade was made
only on October 24. Like the Legal Adviser, Secretary of State
Shultz asserts the final decision was made on October 24. Shultz
claims that a "tentative decision" was made by Reagan at a 4:00-
248. Joyner, supra note 149, at 138-39; Moore, supra note 13, at 159-61; Vagts, supra
note 211, at 170-171; W. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 64-74.
249. Nanda, supra note 11, at 412.
250. Committee on Grenada, supra note 12, at 346. In fact, Scoon did not ask for
outside help on October 23, supra note 228, and the Reagan decision of October 23 was firm,
not provisional. See infra notes 279-305 and accompanying text.
251. Boyle, supra note 224, at 273.
252. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 382.
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7:00 p.m. meeting on October 23, followed by "a sort of semifinal
military decision" at a 2:15-3:30 p.m. meeting on October 24, fol-
lowed by a written "directive" at 6:00 p.m. on October 24.53
Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley is more cau-
tious. He claims that "on October 22, after receiving confirmation
of the OECS request, the President signed orders to prepare for a
broader mission to restore order in Grenada in cooperation with
Caribbean forces." Without clearly indicating how "final" a deci-
sion that was, Motley continues, "Finally, on the evening of Octo-
ber 24, after informing the British Government and the congres-
sional leadership that immediate military action was necessary, the
President ordered U.S. participation in the operation to
proceed. '2
5 4
The Administration's decision to send troops to Grenada was
in fact made on October 22, as indicated by events preceding the
invasion. Immediately after Bishop's arrest on October 13, the Ad-
ministration began planning for military action in Grenada. The
U.S. Ambassador to France, J. Evan Galbraith, stated on French
television on October 26 that the U.S. invasion of Grenada was an
"action which had begun two weeks ago. '255
The Defense Department acknowledges that, at that time, it
was planning for military action in Grenada, but claims the plan-
ning was limited to evacuation of civilians. In a letter to a Congres-
sional committee, the General Counsel of the Defense Department
wrote, "Subsequent to the arrest of Grenadian Prime Minister
Bishop on October 13, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were instructed to
investigate the possibility of conducting U.S. Naval presence and
possible non-combatant evacuation operations if the need to evac-
uate American citizens from the island arose."
2 5
Simultaneously, the Administration, according to Barbados
Prime Minister Adams, approached the Barbados Government and
suggested military action to rescue Maurice Bishop from
253. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 70.
254. Motley, The Decision to Assist Grenada, DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1984, at 71.
255. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 5; Hearing: The Situation in Grenada,
supra note 15, at 10 (remarks of Senator Pell). Galbraith later disclaimed the statement.
Hearing: The Situation in Grenada, supra note 15, at 11 (remarks of Deputy Secretary of
State Dam).
256. Resolution of Inquiry with Respect to United States Activities Regarding Gre-
nada, Committee Print of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1984) (letter from General Counsel, Dept. of Defense, of Jan. 31, 1984, to Dante B. Fascell,
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs).
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custody."'
On October 17, a meeting was called at the State Department
by Assistant Secretary Motley to form a planning group on Gre-
nada.2 5 8 Motley told the participants-middle-level officials of the
State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Defense Department, and National Security Council-to be-
gin serious planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation of
the U.S. medical students. On that date, National Security Advisor
McFarlane informed President Reagan of the discussion at this
meeting, and Reagan ordered planning to proceed for an evacua-
tion operation. 5
On October 19, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated a list of
military resources available for an evacuation operation.260 Gre-
nada Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was executed, following
which U.S. Ambassador Milan Bish sent Washington a cable that
Prime Minister Adams had asked that the United States intervene
in Grenada. 21 This request was apparently made pursuant to the
Barbados cabinet decision of that day to undertake military action
to rescue Bishop and to seek aid in that endeavor from "larger
non-Caribbean countries with the resources necessary to carry out
such an intricate operation."2 6 2 Motley's inter-agency group recom-
mend that planning commence for a full-scale invasion, not merely
an evacuation. 268
Serious planning for an operation both to evacuate U.S. na-
tionals and to overthrow the RMC commenced on October 20.6"
At 8:00 a.m., Rear Admiral Poindexter held a secret meeting in the
White House crisis center of a "crisis pre-planning group, "265
which decided that the situation called for consideration by a
higher-level body, the National Security Council's Special Situa-
tion Group (SSG), chaired by Vice-President George Bush."
Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikl6 chaired a 10:00 a.m.
meeting at the Pentagon to discuss logistics for a military opera-
257. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
258. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at 155.
259. G. SANDFORD & R. VIGILANTE, supra note 80, at 4; Bennett, supra note 151, at 72.
260. Bennett, supra note 151, at 73.
261. Id.
262. See supra text accompanying note 166.
263. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at 155.
264. London Times, Nov. 23, 1983, at 5, col. 6.




tion.126 At roughly the same time, the National Security Council's
"crisis manager" collected maps which illustrated the location and
readiness level of U.S. military units in the Western Hemisphere
and compiled a file of maps, aerial photographs, diplomatic cables,
and intelligence reports known as a national security decision di-
rective (NSDD) for use by President Reagan in making a deci-
sion."" A draft of the directive was available late that afternoon,
when Bush, at Reagan's behest, convened the Special Situation
Group. 269 Meeting participants agreed on the need for secrecy re-
garding the Grenada planning; officials involved in the planning
were advised to maintain regular schedules to avoid public suspi-
cion 27 0 The participants also decided to divert immediately to-
wards Grenada the Marine contingents that had departed for Leb-
anon on October 18.271 Following the meeting, McFarlane gave
Reagan a new draft of the directive. Reagan then told McFarlane
to continue the planning.27 The operation was code-named "Ur-
gent Fury.2 73 The State Department prepared instructions for
Ambassador Bish, who was to attend the OECS meeting planned
for Barbados that evening. The instructions apparently directed
Bish to encourage the OECS to vote to invade Grenada.27 '
On October 21 at 4:00 p.m. President Reagan ordered the
planning of a more detailed type. 27 5 At a 5:00 p.m. meeting at the
White House, attending members discussed whether the operation
should be a noncombatant evacuation mission or a takeover of the
government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were instructed to prepare
for both.276 Late that evening, in Barbados, Prime Minister Charles
told U.S. diplomat Charles A. Gillespie that the OECS states had
voted to ask the United States to join them to remove the RMC.
Gillespie cabled that request to the State Department.2 7
This groundwork culminated in a decision on October 22 to
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 27; Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A7, col. 3.
270. Bennett, supra note 151, at 74.
271. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111 at 27; H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at
156; Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A7, cols. 3-4.
272. Bennett, supra note 151, at 74.
273. Id.
274. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at 156-158. See also supra text accompanying
note 172.
275. Bennett, supra note 151, at 74.
276. Id.
277. Id. On U.S. prompting of the OECS decision, see text accompanying notes 150-79.
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invade. The plan consisted of an operation both to evacuate U.S.
nationals and to overthrow the RMC. At 2:45 a.m., Shultz and Mc-
Farlane discussed the OECS decision of the previous evening.2 7 At
3:30 a.m., Bush convened key advisors,' 79 and it was decided in a
conference call between Washington and Augusta involving Shultz,
McFarlane, Motley, Vessey, Meese, and the CIA, that the ships
heading towards Grenada should be deployed for possible action,
but without arousing suspicion.2 80 They further decided to speed
planning for an invasion." 1 At 4:00 a.m., a military team discussed
logistics. 82 At 5:15 a.m., Shultz and McFarlane informed Reagan
of the OECS decision. Reagan then phoned Bush and Wein-
berger.283At 9:00 a.m., an SSG meeting in Washington8 4 distrib-
uted a newly revised NSDD.2 8 ' The NSDD provided a plan to
"land U.S. and allied Caribbean military forces in order to take
control of Grenada no later than dawn Tuesday," meaning October
25.286 The NSDD specified three objectives that make it clear that
the aim was to assume power in Grenada. The aims indicated were:
(1) "ensuring the safety of American citizens on Grenada," (2) "in
conjunction with OECS friendly government participants, the res-
toration of democratic government on Grenada," and (3) "elimina-
tion of current, and prevention of further, Cuban intervention on
Grenada." 7 Reagan, participating in the meeting from Georgia by
telephone, 8' was asked by Bush about the threefold objective.
Reagan answered, "If we've got to go there, we might as well do all
that needs to be done." 289 The consensus at this meeting was to
invade. "Everyone was gung-ho," one participant reported.
29 0
278. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 69 (Shultz news conference).
279. Id.
280. Telephone interview with Bennett (June 13, 1985)(citing unpublished draft version
of Bennett, supra note 151).
281. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 27.
282. Ten Days of Urgent Fury, ALL HANDS, May 1984, at 34 [hereinafter Ten
Days](official U.S. Navy publication).
283. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 27; Collective Action, supra note 7, at 70
(Shultz news conference).
284. H. O'SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 52, at 160; Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at A7, col. 4;
Collective Action, supra note 7, at 70 (Shultz news conference).
285. Bennett, supra note 151, at 74.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 75.
288. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 70 (Shultz news conference); D-Day in Gre-
nada, supra note 111, at 27.
289. Bennett, supra note 151, at 75.
290. D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 27. No high official at any time in the plan-
ning argued against invading Grenada. Testing Time: Reagan was Reagan, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
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On October 22, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the man
who was to command the mission that an invasion of Grenada was
to occur at dawn October 25:
Late on 22 October, in response to Presidential direction, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Commander in Chief Atlantic,
Admiral Wesley McDonald, with confirmation of the expanded
mission. Operation Urgent Fury was to be conducted not later
than dawn 25 October. CinCLant [Commander in Chief Atlan-
tic] had little more than 48 hours to assemble his forces, plan,
and execute the operation.2 e9
The term "expanded mission" refers to a mission whose purpose is
both to remove the RMC (in contrast to earlier planning that had
focused on evacuation of U.S. nationals) and to the fact that the
mission's participants had expanded to include personnel of Carib-
bean island states.
At a Sunday morning meeting of the National Security Plan-
ning Group, e29 President Reagan commented on the impact on the
Grenada operation of the previous night's bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut: "If this [the Grenada operation] was right yes-
terday, it's right today, and we shouldn't let the act of a couple of
terrorists dissuade us from going ahead."293 Reagan also told meet-
ing participants "that he would not be deterred in Grenada by the
problems in Lebanon and affirmed that the invasion would go
ahead. '20 4 The Sunday morning discussion of the Beirut bombing
indicates that a decision to invade Grenada had already been
made. The issue was whether to postpone the Grenada invasion,
which had been set for Tuesday.29 5 One "senior adviser" reported
Reagan's intent to proceed with the Grenada invasion despite the
Beirut bombing: "He felt very strongly that this was the right
thing to do and it should not be aborted because of what happened
in Lebanon.129 That morning, the U.S. ambassador to Trinidad
7, 1983, at 82 [hereinafter Testing Time].
291. Lt. Col. Michael J. Byron, U.S. Marine Corps, Fury from the Sea: Marines in
Grenada, 110/5/975 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, May 1984, at 119, 124. Another
account claims that McDonald was appointed on the morning of October 22. Ten Days,
supra note 282, at 34.
292. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 70 (Shultz news conference); N.Y. Times, Oct.
26, 1983, at Al, cols. 5-6; D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 28.
293. Bennett, supra note 151, at 75.
294. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at A20, col. 6 (article by Bernard Gwertzman).
295. Testing Time, supra note 290, at 82.
296. Id.
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also reportedly told representatives of Jamaica, Barbados, and the
OECS states, meeting in Trinidad, that the Administration had
decided to invade Grenada.
9 7
The October 22 order to McDonald was passed to lower-rank-
ing officers on October 23. Maj. Gen. Schwarzkopf, deputy com-
mander of the invasion force, said that on the evening of October
23, he received "top secret orders" to report to Norfolk, Virginia,
for an operation against Grenada. He said that the decision to land
troops in Grenada was kept in strict secrecy October 23 and 24.298
A Navy source indicated that in the early afternoon on Octo-
ber 23, the commanders were informed of their mission:
Not until about 40 hours before H-hour [40 hours before 5:00
a.m. October 25 would be 1:00 p.m. October 231 were command-
ing officers of the ships told what the mission in Grenada would
be-to evacuate U.S. citizens, neutralize any resistance, stabilize
the situation and maintain the peace. That didn't leave much
time to get the ships ready.2"9
Defense Secretary Weinberger gave a similar account regarding the
length of time the military had to prepare the invasion. He told a
House subcommittee, "We had less than 48 hours to plan and exe-
cute the operation. '
A U.S. Marine Corps report confirms that operational com-
manders were informed on October 23 of the nature and launch
time of their mission:
[P]lanning initially centered on a NEO [non-combatant evacua-
tion Operation], but on 23 October, the MAU [Marine amphibi-
ous unit] and PHIBRON [amphibious squadron] amphibious
staffs were advised that the operation-now code named UR-
GENT FURY-would be a joint and combined operation with
U.S. and Eastern Caribbean paramilitary forces participating.
D-Day was set for 25 October, with H-Hour at 0500.301
At a 4:00 p.m. meeting, President Reagan gave what Secretary
Shultz called a "tentative" order for the invasion.302 At 6:00 p.m.,
McFarlane gave Reagan a copy of an updated invasion plan. Rea-
297. A. PAYNE, supra note 21, at 151.
298. Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at A34, col. 1.
299. Ten Days, supra note 282, at 19.
300. Hearing: Situation in Lebanon and Grenada, supra note 74, at 40.
301. OPERATIONAL OvEnviEw, supra note 96, at 4.
302. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 70 (Shultz news conference).
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gan signed the document and told McFarlane that the signature
meant that the plan would be carried out.$"3
By Sunday night the Pentagon had advance teams landing in
Grenada. Late that night, four Navy Seals drowned 25 miles from
Grenada in the capsize of a boat used to sneak into Grenada to
undertake reconnaissance. s ' Another team reached Grenada and
determined that the Pearls Airport was not appropriate for an am-
phibious landing, resulting in the decision to take Pearls Airport
by helicopter.305 The fact that the Navy was sending men ashore in
Grenada on Sunday night indicates that by this time a decision to
invade must have been made.
On October 24 at 6:00 p.m. Reagan signed a formal order for
the invasion.30 6 Shultz depicts this as the decision to invade.
30 7
Monday night a U.S. commando team landed in Grenada to evacu-
ate Scoon. They reached his home but were surrounded by the
People's Revolutionary Army.80 8 The U.S. invasion in force began
at 5:00 a.m. October 25, the hour established in the October 22
decision.
The October 22 decision was considered revocable until the
moment of the invasion. Yet the orders given to the commanders
in the field on October 23 seem to have been firm orders. The deci-
sion to invade was made on October 22, with orders to operational
commanders on October 23. Time said the decision was made late
Saturday.309 The Economist said it was "75% made on Satur-
day."81 0 Thus, the Legal Adviser's claim that the decision was a
response to the request is unfounded. Scoon does not claim to have
made a request until October 24 and probably did so on October
25.
While the U.S. decision was not made in response to a request
303. Bennett, supra note 151, at 76; Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1983, at A21, col. 3.
304. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 6, col. 1; Bennett, supra note 151, at 76.
305. Bennett, supra note 151, at 76.
306. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 70 (Shultz news conference).
307. Id.
308. L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 6, col. 4; LATIN AMERICA BUREAU, supra note 78, at 90;
A. PAYNE, supra note 21, at 158; Guardian, Nov. 3, 1983, at 6, cols. 6-7.
309. Referring to President Reagan's options Sunday morning upon learning of the
Marine deaths in Beirut, Time claimed he "momentarily...considered abandoning the in-
vasion." D-Day in Grenada, supra note 111, at 28.
310. ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1984, at 32. Payne, Sutton, and Thorndike concluded "that
the critical decision of principle to prepare militarily for an invasion was taken at this [9:00
a.m.] Saturday meeting." A. PAYNE, supra note 21, at 150.
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from Scoon, if he expressed consent prior to the invasion (assum-
ing he had the capacity to do so), that would legitimize the U.S.
entry into Grenada. The essence of aggression is military entry ac-
complished without the consent of the territorial state. If the terri-
torial state expresses its consent prior to the entry, then the entry
is not accomplished against its consent."' Hence the entry would
be consensual. Thomas and Thomas write in this regard, "If a state
consents to an interference within its protected sphere of interests
prior to or simultaneously with the act of interference, the act can
be said to be legitimate by principle or traditional international
law."' 2 Consent of the territorial state is the key. Here the United
States took its decision to intervene absent an expression of con-
sent from Grenada. Thus it intended to commit aggression. Its
leaders are responsible under the Nuremberg principles for plan-
ning a war of aggression.3 13 By setting a time for the invasion and
setting the invasion planning in motion, they manifested an intent
to commit aggression.
Boyle, as indicated above, took the view that since the alleged
request "came well after Reagan's order to invade, the former be-
comes completely immaterial to analyzing the legality or illegality
of the U.S. invasion."'1 4 But because consent of the territorial state
is the issue, the causal connection between the decision and the
request is not decisive. The Legal Adviser claims such a connec-
tion, but such a connection is not necessary to the U.S. argument,
at least as regards aggression as opposed to planning a war of ag-
gression. Intervention may be accomplished with the consent of
the territorial state even if it is not in response to a request from
that state. If an outside state decides to intervene, and before it
does so the territorial state expresses its willingness to have the
intervention, the intervention would not occur against the will of
311. IL BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 321.
312. A.V.W. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN
THE AMERICAS 91 (1956)[hereinafter A.V.W. THOMAS].
313. The "planning" and "preparation" of a "war of aggression" are defined as consti-
tuting "crimes against peace" by article 6(a) of the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal in the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 79. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 196-99. An exam-
ple of planning of aggression being found unlawful though the actual introduction of troops
was not (consent given prior to entry of troops) is provided by the Judgment of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg with respect to the Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia
in 1939. Id. at 211; R. Womram, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (1962);
C. POMPE, AGGRESSIVE WAR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 23-24 (1953).
314. F. BOYLE, supra, note 224, at 273.
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the territorial state and hence would not be aggression."' 5
While Scoon claims to have made a request prior to entry of
U.S. forces, it is unlikely, as indicated above, that he did so. He
did, however, express his consent after entry of U.S. forces into
Grenada. If consent is given only after entry of foreign forces, the
entry, having been accomplished without the consent of the terri-
torial state, is unlawful. However, expression of consent after entry
of foreign forces would legitimize the further stay of the foreign
troops in the territorial state. From that point forward, the occupa-
tion would not be illegal. A major problem in such a scenario, how-
ever, is the voluntariness of the consent given by the territorial
state. Consent granted after entry of foreign troops is suspect. It
may well have been given with a knife at the throat.31 e Assuming,
however, that it is freely given as an expression of the sovereign
will of the territorial state, the consent legitimizes the further stay
of the foreign forces. It does not, however, legitimize the initial
entry.
For reasons to which we now turn, this reasoning does not le-
315. A. THOMAS, supra note 308, at 91. Apparently disagreeing with this view is Char-
pentier, who, in discussing a request for intervention, writes: "It is nonetheless required, of
course, that the request be spontaneous, that it does not conceal the importuning of the
requested state, that it reflect the interests of the state that makes it so that the state that
responds can reasonably prove that it would not have intervened if it had not been re-
quested." Charpentier, Les effets du consentement sur l'intervention, 2 MALANGES StFfR-
tADiS 489, 495 (kcole des Sciences Politiques "Panteios" d'Athtnes ed. 1961). The author
agrees that the intervention is illegitimate if the request was issued only at the instigation of
the intervening state and against the will of the territorial state. But he does not believe
that the intervening state must prove that it would not have intervened if it had not been
requested. As suggested in the text, even if the intervening state would have intervened
regardless of any expression of consent from the territorial state, the intervention is legiti-
mate if the territorial state expresses consent prior to the intervention. Another possible
fact scenario, though one not raised by the Grenada situation, would involve expression of
consent prior to entry but where the expression of consent does not come to the attention of
the intervening state prior to the entry. The authorities of the territorial state issue an
invitation, but it is not received prior to the entry. Such would seem to be a valid expression
of consent. The validity of the expression of consent should not turn on whether the inter-
vening state becomes aware of it prior to the entry. The rationale here is that the key ele-
ment is the expression of consent by the territorial state, not the intent of the intervening
state. This is the view adopted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg with
respect to the German entry into Austria in 1938. The Tribunal found no aggression on the
theory that an invitation was sent, though due to the inefficiency of the Austrian post the
invitation was not received by Germany prior to its introduction of troops into Austria. R.
WOTZEL, supra note 313, at 160; Sohn, Gradations of Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 225 (1983).
316. "If it [the intervening power] exerted pressure to obtain from the victim [state]
modification of its behavior, then the consent is precisely the result sought, the culmination
of the intervention." Charpentier, supra note 315, at 494.
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gitimize the further stay of U.S. forces in Grenada.
C. The Governor-General Had No Authority to Request
Military Intervention: The RMC was a Functioning Government
At the time of the alleged request, the RMC was the function-
ing government in Grenada. Therefore, even if Scoon did issue a
request for intervention prior to its commencement, and even if his
position as Governor-General is one that would give him the execu-
tive power claimed by the State Department, intervention based
on his request would nonetheless be unlawful. The State Depart-
ment claims a "vacuum of responsible governmental authority '" 7
existed in Grenada, and that, therefore, its reliance on Scoon's re-
quest was not misplaced as he acted as the "sole source of govern-
mental legitimacy."318 In fact, as the Department was well aware,
the RMC was exercising governmental functions in Grenada. Apart
from this factual inadequacy, the Department's argument is flawed
because international law does not permit military intervention in
the event of a "vacuum of authority."
The Legal Adviser asserts that Scoon "was the recognized
head of state of longstanding tenure confronted by the breakdown
of government in his nation."831 Deputy Secretary Dam describes
the situation as "a collapse of law, order, and governmental institu-
tions." ' Both are wrong with respect to the factual situation ex-
isting in Grenada at the time. As Gilmore states, "the RMC was,
through the instrumentalities of repression available to it, in effec-
tive control of the entire territory of the state within the meaning
of international law."32' The A.B.A. report, similarly, states,
"There is reason to argue that under applicable rules of recogni-
tion, General Austin's Revolutionary Military Council was entitled
to recognition as the de facto, if not the de jure, government of
Grenada."322
The Department was well aware that the RMC was in effective
control, as it had been dealing with the RMC as the government of
Grenada since the RMC took power on October 19. State Depart-
317. Kirkpatrick, 38 U.N. SCOR (2491st mtg.) at 38, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2491 (1938).
318. Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 11 (statement of Deputy Secre-
tary Dam).
319. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 383.
320. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 81.
321. W. GILMORE, supra note 11, at 73.
322. Committee on Grenada, supra note 12, at 349.
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ment emissaries had conducted talks with the RMC in Grenada in
its capacity as the government of Grenada. s2 3 The RMC had effec-
tively imposed a twenty-four-hour curfew on Grenada from Octo-
ber 20 to 23."" It ended that curfew October 24, leading to a return
to most normal activity, with no significant breach of public order.
The RMC was exercising governmental functions; therefore,
Scoon cannot be regarded by other states as governmental author-
ity in Grenada. As Wright stated in analyzing another intervention
situation:
It is presumed that a government in firm possession of the terri-
tory of a state, even if not generally recognized, can speak for
the state. This was the opinion of Chief Justice Taft in the Ti-
noco Arbitration between Great Britain and Costa Rica in 1923.
There is a presumption, on the other hand, that a government,
even if generally recognized cannot speak for the state if it is not
in firm possession of the state's territory. In international law
the de facto situation is presumed to overrule the de jure situa-
tion-ex factis jus oritur.3s2
To be effective, a request for military intervention must come
from a government actually in power. On this principle Soviet reli-
ance on a request from the Kadar Government for military inter-
vention in Hungary in 1956 was challenged in the United Nations.
At the time it issued its request, the Kadar Government was not in
actual control.3 2
6
Even if Scoon could be considered "the sole remaining source
of governmental legitimacy," as Dam argued,3 27 he could not speak
for Grenada because he was not controlling Grenada. Thus, the
Department's argument fails because it is factually incorrect.
But even if the Department were correct that there existed a
"vacuum of authority" in Grenada, it could still not rely on a re-
quest from Scoon to intervene militarily. This is so because no doc-
trine permits intervention in such a situation. The Legal Adviser
states the Department's argument that international law permits
intervention to restore order where order does not exist:
323. Id. This despite Deputy Secretary Dam's statement that "there was nobody really
to negotiate with." Hearing: U.S. Military Actions, supra note 22, at 27.
324. Committee on Grenada, supra note 12, at 349.
325. Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112, 120 (1959).
A report of the Tinoco Arbitration appears in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924).
326. Sohn, supra note 315, at 226. Accord Charpentier, supra note 315, at 496.
327. Collective Action, supra note 7, at 80-81 (Deputy Secretary Dam).
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The request of lawful authority is a well established basis
for providing military assistance, whether the requesting State is
seeking assistance in the exercise of its inherent right of self de-
fense recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
[which the Legal Adviser is not asserting], or for other lawful
purposes, such as maintenance of internal order [which the Le-
gal Adviser is asserting].3 8
As authority for this proposition, the Legal Adviser cites Lauter-
pacht's 1955 edition of Oppenheim's treatise. 2 9 However, Oppen-
heim only discusses requests by governments in factual control
under challenge by insurgents. The difficulty is seen in the Legal
Adviser's phrasing. He writes that a request of lawful authority is a
basis for providing military assistance where the requesting au-
thority's purpose is "maintenance of internal order." The implica-
tion there-and in all the literature on the subject, including Op-
penheim-is that a functioning government is requesting
assistance to maintain internal order. It must be in a position of
exercising authority but unable to put down a group that chal-
lenges its control.
As the Legal Adviser concedes such was not the situation in
Grenada.830 When a government breakdown in a state occurs, the
party granted executive power under the local constitution may
not ask for outside military intervention unless that party is in fac-
tual control. This would be so even if there were no question over
Scoon's role under the Grenada Constitution. One can assume a
situation where an individual has been elected chief executive
under a state's constitution but has been overthrown by a coup.
Assume that the coup leaders depart the state, leaving no one in
charge. At this point the president controls nothing; there is no
army, no one is attempting to control the state. It is the logic of
the Legal Adviser's view that in this situation that chief executive
would have the power to invite outside military intervention. But
there is no doctrine permitting a figure not in actual control to
make such a request.
This hypothetical exemplifies the absurdity of the Legal Ad-
328. Legal Adviser, supra note 1, at 382.
329. 1 Lauterpacht, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (1955).
330. See supra text accompanying note 210. Time pointed out that the Grenada inva-
sion involved intervention to unseat a government: "[Nlever before in this century have
U.S. troops actually invaded a country to fight against a ruling government." D-Day in Gre-
nada, supra note 111, at 47-48.
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viser's assertion regarding the "breakdown of government." A
"breakdown of government" in reality occurs only where there are
contending factions. Here the Legal Adviser is asserting something
else-a vacuum of authority. But one is hard put to cite to previ-
ous situations of vacuum of authority. There is always either a gov-
ernment exercising peaceful control or a situation of contending
factions. No intervention situations that have arisen have involved
a "vacuum of authority," that is, a situation where no one is exer-
cising control or contending for control.
In asserting a right to intervene militarily in a situation of al-
leged breakdown of government, the Department is asserting novel
law. Bowett, listing the situations in which it has been argued that
outside states have a right to intervene militarily in the territory of
another state, does not list breakdown of government.33' Boyle,
writing with respect to Grenada, states correctly that "chronic dis-
order in a country does not permit neighboring states to intervene
for the purpose of re-establishing minimum public security.
'332
Clearly the RMC was exercising factual control. The United States
thus overthrew a functioning government by intervening. It did not
fill a void.333
331. D. Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense, in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WoRLn 41-46 (J.N. Moore ed. 1974). Joyner and Gri-
maldi assert that a state may intervene to restore domestic order in another state when
anarchy prevails if the anarchy endangers the intervening state. "International law recog-
nizes the legality of certain interventionary actions taken in order to 'abate' an intolerable
regional nuisance. When conditions in the territory of a neighboring state approach anarchy,
and the constituted municipal authorities are unable to restore domestic order, then the
abatement theory holds that a neighboring state threatened by the chaotic situation has a
legal duty to intervene, by armed force if necessary, in order to put down the disturbance
and thereby ensure that those disruptive conditions do not spill over and affect its internal
stability." Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Law-
fulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621, 674 (1985). Joyner and Gri-
maldi cite von Glahn, who writes: "If no selfish aims are involved in the intervention in
question, if no territorial aggrandizement or other gain is contemplated or realized, then it is
difficult, in many instances, to deny a right, based on self-defense or self-preservation, to
violate the ban on intervention for the sake of abating the nuisance at one's doorstep." G.
VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 168
(1981). The principle asserted by Joyner-Grimaldi and von Glahn differs from that of the
Legal Adviser, who does not base his argument on the threat to neighboring states. The
Legal Adviser asserts invitation from the "last vestige of authority" in the state as the legal
basis in a situation of anarchy. See supra text accompanying notes 317-18. In any event, the
principle asserted by Joyner-Grimaldi and von Glahn is questionable. Von Glahn cites little
state practice and none in the post-U.N.-Charter era. Even if such a principle were to be
found in customary law, it would not be valid among member states of the OAS in light of
the strict anti-intervention propositions stated in articles 18-20 of the OAS Charter.
332. F. BoY-, supra note 224, at 273.
333. States intervening militarily, even absent any request, have justified their actions
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is a serious threat to international order when a state pos-
sessing military power is able to use that power to install favorable
regimes in other states. It is a further threat to international order
when states so acting distort evidence to make their actions appear
lawful. The State Department knowingly fabricated information in
order to justify the 1983 Grenada invasion. The falsification perpe-
trated by the State Department was not successful in the United
Nations, where both the Security Council and General Assembly
condemned the U.S. action by a substantial majority. The Depart-
ment's arguments based on rescue of nationals and on a request
from lawful authority were belied by facts known to the Depart-
ment. The Department knew there was no serious danger to U.S.
nationals, that it was still possible to evacuate U.S. nationals with-
out military force, and that introduction of military force would
seriously endanger U.S. nationals.
Long interested in overthrowing the leftist government of Gre-
nada, the Department urged the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean States to issue a request for intervention, even though such a
asserting that the state lacks order. But these assertions have been limited to situations in
which the intervening state alleges that the lack of order threatens to "spill over" into the
intervening state, across a common border. Thus, the United States asserted the need to
send troops into Mexico to pursue Villa, following an attack by Villa at a town in the United
States, in part on the ground that disorder reigned in northern Mexico and that therefore
the only way to assure that attacks into the United States would not be repeated was for
U.S military intervention. Finch, Mexico and the United States, 11 Am. J. INT'L L. 399, 401
(1917). Italy sought to justify its use of military force in Ethiopia in 1935 by referring, inter
alia, to chronic disorder in Ethiopia that threatened Italian territory (neighboring Eritrea).
1. BROWNLI., supra note 5, at 347. Japan sought to justify its use of military force in China
in 1931 by referring, inter alia, to a desire to bring about "the restoration of order in that
country." Hyde, Legal Aspects of the Japanese Pronouncement in Relation to China," 28
Am. J. INT'L L. 431 (1934). As occupant of Korea, Japan shared a border with China at that
time. In all three cases, the alleged disorder in the state in question was alleged to be rele-
vant only because the disorder might affect a neighboring state. In the U.S.-Mexico case,
there had already been an attack into the United States. In the Grenada case, the State
Department is not alleging that the alleged disorder in Grenada might have "spilled over"
into the United States or into island states in the vicinity of Grenada. In any event, the
doctrine propounded by the United States, Italy, and Japan in the three cases mentioned
has probably not survived the United Nation Charter, even if it were good law prior to
adoption of the Charter. In the three cases mentioned, the only one in which the asserted
justification met with significant acceptance was the U.S.-Mexico case, and there a raid into
the United States had occurred. In the Grenada case it was asserted in defense of the U.S.
action, (though not by the Legal Adviser) that there was a danger of an attack by Grenada
against neighboring island states. That is a different matter from disorder that might "spill
over."
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request could not properly be made under the OECS treaty. After
the OECS voted to issue a request to the United States, the De-
partment drafted a request to itself from the OECS. When reliance
on article 8 of the OECS treaty was subjected to telling criticism,
the Department abandoned that theory and developed a new and
equally implausible justification for the invasion-reliance on arti-
cles 3 and 6 of the OECS treaty.
The Department tried to create the impression that U.S.
forces entered Grenada in response to an invitation from the
Grenadian Governor-General. U.S. forces hand-carried letters of
invitation prepared for the Governor-General's signature. Then the
Department falsely claimed it had received both an oral and a
written communication from the Governor-General prior to the
invasion.
That the Department went to such lengths to falsify facts to
make the Grenada invasion appear legal reflects a disturbing dis-
dain for the rules of international conduct. The Department's falsi-
fication reflect the frailty of the prohibition against use of force
between states. Exceptions to that prohibition have strong basis in
reason yet are subject to manipulation which can render the excep-
tion more dangerous than the harm it is supposed to cure. Specifi-
cally, the rescue of endangered nationals exception is subject to
abuse by the United States in a world in which resentment against
the United States exists in many quarters. If U.S. nationals can be
deemed to have been in imminent danger in Grenada, they can be
so deemed in many states where the United States might desire to
intervene militarily.
Consent of the territorial state and action under regional trea-
ties are exceptions to the prohibition on use of force whose suscep-
tibility to abuse is also revealed by the Grenada situation. The
OECS countries and rightist elements in Grenada cooperated in
the Department's efforts to make the invasion appear consensual.
In a world in which political division is sharp, such local elements
are often available to provide an appearance of consent.
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